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This thesis examines Salvadoran policies that addressed the rise in violent crime 
by gangs. These gangs have posed the biggest security risk to El Salvador since the end 
of the civil war in 1992. The two biggest gangs are the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 
18th Street, both originating in Los Angeles, CA, and which have proliferated throughout 
the Americas since the 1990s. 
Salvadoran administrations have tried to solve the issue in different manners. The 
Nationalist Republican Alliance administration (1997–2009) created the Mano Dura 
(Iron Hand) policies in 2003 and Super Mano Dura in 2004 in an attempt to decrease 
violent crime through repressive police tactics and incarcerations. The result was higher 
homicide rates. The National Farabundo Martí Liberation administrations (2009–present) 
negotiated a Gang Truce between MS-13 and 18th Street to move past Mano Dura, 
leading to a modest decrease in homicides in 2012 and 2013. The results, however, were 
mixed in the levels of violent crime other than homicides. The truce was broken and 
replaced by a comprehensive social outreach strategy called Plan El Salvador Seguro. 
The argument is that after Plan El Salvador Seguro is implemented, the results should 
reverse the trend of rising violent crime, but it is going to take time—and money. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................2 
B. ARGUMENT, POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS, AND 
HYPOTHESES ..........................................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................3 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
1. Origin of Gang Violence during Political Transition .................5 
2. Structural Argument on Gangs in Central America ..................7 
3. The Iron Hand Approach—Mano Dura and Super Mano 
Dura .................................................................................................9 
4. The Gang Truce ...........................................................................10 
5. Institutional Arguments—El Salvador Seguro ..........................11 
E. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................12 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW .............................................................................15 
II. EL SALVADOR’S GANGS AND MANO DURA POLICIES .........................17 
A. POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD .................................................................18 
1. El Salvador’s Stalemate, Peace, and Political Transition ........18 
2. The Rise of Violent Crime in El Salvador .................................19 
a. 18th Street Gang and the Mara Salvatrucha in Los 
Angeles ..............................................................................20 
b. Criminal Deportation from the United States ..................21 
c. Proliferation ......................................................................22 
B. THE CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MANO 
DURA POLICIES ....................................................................................23 
1. Mano Dura to Super Mano Dura ...............................................24 
2. The Flores Administration ..........................................................25 
3. The Saca Administration and Super Mano Dura .....................26 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................28 
III. CRIME PREVENTION POLICY SHIFT DURING FARABUNDO 
MARTIN LIBERATION FRONT RULE .........................................................31 
A. FARABUNDO MARTIN LIBERATION FRONT PARTY 
INHERITED SUPER MANO DURA ......................................................31 
1. The First Farabundo Martin Liberation Front President 
of El Salvador, Mauricio Funes ..................................................32 
a. Exploring a Gang Truce ...................................................35 
B. THE GANG TRUCE ...............................................................................36 
 viii 
C. CERÉN DISREGARDS GANG TRUCE ..............................................39 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................42 
IV. PLAN EL SALVADOR SEGURO .......................................................................45 
A. MOVING ON FROM THE PAST INTO THE PRESENT .................45 
B. COUNCIL FOR CITIZENS’ SECURITY AND EL SALVADOR 
SEGURO ...................................................................................................46 
C. OUTCOME OF PLAN EL SALVADOR SEGURO IN 2015 ................54 
D. RESULT....................................................................................................56 
V. CONCLUSION: COMPARING MANO DURA AND  EL SALVADOR 
SEGURO AND WHY IT MATTERS .................................................................59 
A. HOW THE SECURITY SITUATION LED TO MANO DURA ..........59 
B. MOVING ON FROM THE REPRESSIVE TACTICS OF 
MANO DURA ...........................................................................................61 
C. WHY ANTICRIME POLICIES IN EL SALVADOR MATTER .......63 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................65 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Homicide rate during ARENA presidencies (2000–2009). .......................27 
Figure 2. Homicides under FMLN Administrations. ................................................34 
Figure 3. Violent Crime Other than Homicides (per 100,000). ................................38 
Figure 4. Homicide Rate at the Municipal Level in El Salvador, 2013. ...................50 
Figure 5. Homicides Reported in El Salvador (2004–2015). ....................................52 
Figure 6. Homicide Rate in El Salvador (2000–2015). .............................................63 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. The Most Similar Method for Comparing Antigang Policies. .....................4 
Table 2. Homicide Rates during Super Mano Dura (2003–2011). ..........................10 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ARENA Alianza Republica Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance)  
CARSI Central America Regional Security Initiative 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CNSCC Consejo Nacional de la Seguridad Ciudadano y Convivencia 
(National Council on Citizen Security and Coexistence) 
DC Washington, DC, region 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
ESCA Estrategia de Seguridad Centroamericana (Central American 
Security Strategy) 
FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front) 
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act 
IML Instituto de Medicina Legal (National Forensics Institute) 
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 
IPAZ Iniciativa Pastoral de la Vida y la Paz (Pastoral Initiative for Life 
and Peace) 
MS-13 Mara Salvatrucha 
PFG Partnership for Growth 
PNC Policía Nacional Civil (National Police Force) 
UAC Unaccompanied Children 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNOSAL United Nations Mission in El Salvador 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WOLA Washington Office on Latin America 
  
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I spent too many late nights writing while drifting off, thinking about my family 
sleeping soundly, and wishing I was spending time with them instead. I will be forever 
grateful for their support during this challenging time, while I was away from their side, 
with my head in the books. My thanks to my amazing wife, Claudia, for always giving 
me the confidence it takes to undertake such a difficult task as completing a master’s 
thesis. She is so wonderful and a blessing, making up for my absences while raising our 
intelligent and gorgeous daughter, Ariella. I dedicate this work to the two of you for 
helping me realize what is important in life, and for giving me the strength and purpose to 
push on and achieve my goals. I thank my parents and siblings for their support, now and 
throughout the past decade and a half of my naval service, and for loving me although I 
have been gone most of that time. 
I am thankful and indebted to the United States of America, the United States 
Naval Academy, and the Naval Postgraduate School for affording me these opportunities 
to further my education as an undergraduate and graduate student under the guidance of 
some of the greatest minds in our country. I would have never imagined that I would 
have been able to further my education at these great institutions. From the beginning, the 
one person who inspired me so enthusiastically and supported my studies since I entered 
the program was my advisor, Thomas Bruneau, whom I consider a giant among 
academics throughout the world. He exceeded any expectations I may have had of a 
professor and his guidance has been invaluable, and I cannot thank him enough. I would 
also like to thank my co-advisor, Diego Esparza, who taught me so much about research 
writing, gave me confidence in my ability to complete my project, and quickly gained my 
trust and respect. In the end, this would not have been completed satisfactorily were it not 
for the assistance of my editor, Richard Mastowski. I have been lucky to have so much 
support during this process. 
  
 xvi 
I am grateful for the years I spent on the Central Coast and in the Monterey Bay 
area with friends, family, and the great professors whom I have had the privilege to learn 
so much from during my time in Monterey. 
 
1I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Salvadoran civil war, the country’s biggest security risk has 
been the rise of gangs. The demilitarization and demobilization of El Salvador’s security 
forces that started in 1992 led to a security vacuum after the civil war. Despite the 
Salvadoran peace transition being a relative success story for ending the country’s civil 
war, the post-civil war governments have been ineffective in addressing lawlessness.1 
The situation is further complicated by gang members being deported out of the United 
States and into El Salvador. These gangsters were the refugees escaping the bloody civil 
war and ended up in gangs after arriving in the United States, joining for a myriad of 
reasons. Initially, there was no need for antigang policies, until the rising number of 
violent crimes and homicides by self-proclaimed gangsters, or “pandilleros,” pushed the 
government to create them in 2003.2 The initial response was draconian laws under 
President Francisco Flores (1999–2004) that would come to be known as the Mano Dura 
(Iron Hand) policies. This was antigang legislation that would call for the arrest of 
gangsters, removal of all graffiti, and broad area sweeps in search of suspected gang 
members.3 These policies would become even more repressive in the enhanced Super 
Mano Dura policies by the following Antonio Saca administration (2004–2009), which 
gave the police authority to apprehend anyone who may even appear to be gang affiliated 
in order to dismantle the gangs. The Salvadoran administrations pursued these policies 
for a dozen years, until President Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014-present) commissioned 
the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia (CNSCC or National 
Council on Citizen Security and Coexistence). The CNSCC turns its back on 
Super Mano Dura and instead works to find and address the root causes for gang 
1 Wim Savenije and Chris Van Der Borgh, “Youth Gangs, Social Exclusion, & the Transformation of 
Violence in El Salvador,” in Armed Actors: Organised Violence & State Failure in Latin America, eds. 
Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London: Zed Books, 2004), 155. 
2 Sonja Wolf, Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, 2016), 72. 
3 Wolf, Mano Dura, 72. 
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proliferation in order to decrease recruitment and gang affiliation. The CNSCC’s results 
became known as the El Salvador Seguro Plan.4 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis’s research question is what is the probability El Salvador Seguro will 
be better at curbing gang-related violence in El Salvador Mano Dura (2003–2004) and 
Super Mano Dura policies (2004–2012)? 
B. ARGUMENT, POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS, AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis argues that El Salvador can decrease violent crime with El Salvador 
Seguro more effectively than it did with the Super Mano Dura policies. The majority of 
the approaches made by El Salvador in combating crime have been based on the “broken 
windows” theory by Dr. Geoure L. Kelling and Dr. James Q. Wilson in 1982, combined 
with tougher, repressive tactics.5 The new approach of the Cerén administration has been 
to focus on softer, more socially based policies in the form of the “Velvet Glove” as 
described by Mary Jackman.6 This thesis will show that the focus of Super Mano Dura 
was more on incarceration, with minimal attention given to the rehabilitation and 
reintegration portions of the plan under the conservative Alianza Republica Nacionalista 
(Nationalist Republican Alliance or ARENA) Party. With the focus on the issues of 
prevention and social programs, El Salvador Seguro may lead to a decrease in criminal 
violence and an improved public perception of the security situation in El Salvador. 
These new policies have the potential to strengthen the rule of law in El Salvador. If the 
new policies prove ineffective, citizens could be forced to flee the violence, leading to an 
increase of immigrants to neighboring countries.  
                                                 
4 Office of the President of El Salvador, “Plan El Salvador Seguro Es Un Documento de Acción 
Realmente Consensuado: Representante Residente Del PNUD.” Presidencia de La República de El 
Salvador. January 15, 2015. http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/plan-el-salvador-seguro-es-un-documento-de-
accion-realmente-consensuado-representante-residente-del-pnud/. 
5 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” Atlantic 3 (March 1982), 1–9, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. 
6 Mary R. Jackman, The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations 
(Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 208. 
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Insecurity among society is the dependent variable, and the independent variables 
being the two contrasting policies, the authoritative Super Mano Dura and the socially 
focused El Salvador Seguro. Two hypotheses develop how the policies may affect 
insecurity after they are implemented. For instance, if H1 if Super Mano Dura works, 
then violent crime decreases. Violent crime is depicted throughout this thesis by 
homicide rates as well as other forms of violent crimes, which inhibit the public’s 
confidence in their security. The argument is that El Salvador Seguro’s focus will lead to 
the decrease in violent crime and therefore decrease insecurity among citizens. There are 
three possible hypotheses the future Salvadoran policies dealing with criminal 
organizations and gang activity under President Cerén may predict 
 H1, if Mano Dura is implemented, then crime will decrease.  
 H2, If Super Mano Dura is implemented, then crime will decrease. 
 H3, if Velvet Glove approach is implemented then crime will decrease 
violent gang-related crime. 
I argue that criminal violence cannot get much worse than it was under the Super 
Mano Dura policies. A renewed focus from the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front or FMLN) party 
leaders may lead to a different outcome in comparison to the attempts made by the 
previous ARENA political party’s rule. The FMLN has established a majority in the 
National Assembly. In addition to holding onto the presidency for a second term, the 
administration should be able to focus more on societal solutions to gang proliferation, 
such as decreasing gang recruitment, increasing rehabilitation, and reintegration  
into society. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This analysis is a comparative case study employing a “most-similar” method of 
analysis, generally normal to case-study and historical research.7 The dimension of 
analysis of this system is diachronic longitudinal. By using the most-similar method I 
                                                 
7 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 223.  
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compare the outcome of the two forms of policies this thesis focuses on making the time 
passed the only difference yet negligible.8 The dichotomous variables are Iron 
Hand/Mano Dura type policies and the Velvet Glove inspired strategy, and were both 
implemented in the same country, with very little change in history, and culture. The 
difference I am researching is the levels of violent crime, whether they increase or 
decrease after the policies are implemented. That is comparing two-cases with only one 
changing variable: the policies implemented, all displayed in Table 1 showing the most-
similar method. The outcome is measured in the statistics of violent crime, mostly 
homicide rates, except where the rates are misleading. In this instant, during the Gang 
Truce, the statistics measures are violent crimes that other than homicides, such as 
extortion, kidnappings, robberies, and burglaries. The Gang Truce was never an official 
policy, just a temporary approach during the era of Super Mano Dura. The methodology 
is appropriate for the research question because it aims to compare the policies used to 
decrease criminal violence from 2003 to 2015, making the difference in time the only 
aspect that is obviously different. 
Table 1.   The Most Similar Method for Comparing Antigang Policies.9 
Cases Crime Policy History Culture Crime Rate 
El Salvador 
(2003–2014) Mano Dura Mano Dura Mano Dura Higher 
El Salvador 
(2015-Present) Velvet Glove Velvet Glove Velvet Glove Lower 
 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review examines combating gang violence in El Salvador, the 
influences that shaped these policies throughout Latin America and the United States, and 
their results in decreasing lawlessness throughout the region. Prior to delving into the past 
policies of Mano Dura, Super Mano Dura, the Gang Truce, and El Salvador Seguro, it is 
important to know how the post-Salvadoran civil war climate and the immigrant gang 
                                                 
8 Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 209–210. 
9 Ibid., 211. 
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members deported from the United States created a public security problem in  
El Salvador. 
1. Origin of Gang Violence during Political Transition 
Gang violence is not new in El Salvador nor is it the only country that must deal 
with the issue of gangs. There are other countries throughout Central and South America, 
as well as the United States that have to deal with this issue. Enrique Arias compares 
gangs from other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean,10 and reviews the factors 
from a historical, political, and social aspect. He examines the parallels with a detailed, 
historical analysis of how state systems contribute to the existence of criminal gangs. 
Arias argues that different political systems establish different forms of policies to 
address criminal organizations and that interaction from the state shapes the success or 
failure to control the violence by these criminal organizations. The existence of gangs and 
powerful criminal organizations reflects a failure of the state as a function of history, 
state structure, and implemented policies. 
The state’s response in preventing the gangs from carrying out their illegal 
activities was slow to begin with, as the country was normalizing and transitioning to 
peace after more than a decade of civil war. José Miguel Cruz, Rafael Fernandez  
de Castro, and Gema Santamaría Balmaceda argue that the shortcomings of the country’s 
political transition laid the groundwork for later state responses, which aggravated the 
gang problem.11 They discuss the effect that the state’s role had on the increasing gang 
violence and its link to the security institutions. The authoritarian legacy left by those 
security forces that had previous experience on the government’s side during a brutal 
regime carried over after demobilization. The actions of these brutal regimes affected the 
legitimacy of public security and the enforcement of the law. 
                                                 
10 Enrique D. Arias, “State Power & Central American Maras: A Cross-National Comparison,” in 
Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and 
Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 135. 
11 José M. Cruz, Rafael F. de Castro, and Gema S. Balmaceda, “Political Transition, Social Violence, 
and Gangs: Cases in Central America and Mexico,” in In The Wake of War: Democratization and Internal 
Armed Conflict in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2012), 318. 
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Gang violence is the leading cause of homicides in El Salvador and requires a 
state-wide response to combat. There are authors who debate that gang violence alone 
leads to murders and rapes in the country, and yet others describe the violence as a direct 
reflection of the state’s reaction to the gangs using authoritarian tactics that result in more 
violent responses by the gangs. José Miguel Cruz, in “The Impact of Violent Crime on 
the Political Culture of Latin America: The Special Case of Central America,” analyzes 
the impact of criminal violence by focusing on victimization, insecurity, support for 
democracy in Latin America, and the degree of democratic consolidation, as well as 
democratic stability.12 The author argues that crime erodes Latin American countries’ 
democratic political culture, but the results show that the real effect is on the perception 
of citizens about the victimization and insecurity through the media and reports. This 
perception plays an important role in democratic political culture, government 
performance regarding public security, and contributes to the leverage that governments 
have in democratic countries. The perception of violence gives these youth gangs their 
reputation, which allows them to continue to pursue their criminal enterprises knowing 
that their reputation will precede them and assist in their ability to carry out their  
elicit business. 
The authors identified three factors that reproduced violence in mostly urban 
areas in El Salvador: Frustrations caused by social and economic hardship; normalization 
of violence from growing up with it due to the civil war; and the presence of perverse 
social organizations, with no real effect on the problem. Poverty alone does not cause 
crime. For instance, Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, which 
experiences only a fraction of the gang violence that El Salvador endures. Poverty can, 
however, be an added factor that causes violence. The task of the crime prevention 
policies is to interrupt these causal elements, create alternatives for youths to express 
themselves, and create employment. 
                                                 
12 José M. Cruz, “The Impact of Violent Crime on the Political Culture of Latin America: The Special 
Case of Central America,” in Challenges to Democracy in Latin America & the Caribbean: Evidence from 
the Americas Barometer 2006-07, ed. Mitchell A. Seligson (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 
2008), 219. 
72. Structural Argument on Gangs in Central America
The Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street gangs both originated in Southern 
California. Undocumented immigrants that were found to commit crimes were being 
deported from the United States after the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 and resulted in the gangs spreading throughout 
Central America—a region not equipped or prepared for their arrival. In Gangs 
of Central America, Dennis Rodgers et al. credit the deportation of over 
200,000 immigrants back to the isthmus for the increased insecurity in the region, 
believing that these countries were not prepared for dealing with those criminals 
adequately.13  José Luis Rocha reasons that migratory patterns have a strong correlation 
to the presence of gangs in countries.14 As a result, Nicaraguan refugees fleeing the civil 
war were more likely to arrive in Miami alongside Cuban refugees instead of Los 
Angeles with the other Central American immigrants. Nicaragua avoided the after-
effect of deported gang members and gang culture back to Nicaragua as occurred 
in the Northern Triangle countries, which have the highest number of gang 
members deported from the Los Angeles area. 
Savenije and van der Borgh argue that street gangs get the majority of the media 
attention for the rise in criminal violence.15 Sonja Wolf, a researcher on gang violence in 
Latin America, also argues that the media, for political reasons, broadcasts that the gangs 
are considered the main reason for insecurity in the country. Borgh’s structural argument 
gives credit to the drug trade for funding and fueling the increased violence along with 
extortions and kidnappings.16 He argues that the violence should be analyzed in the 
context of major categories, which include social exclusion, violent culture, rapid 
13 Dennis Rodgers, Robert Mugga, and Chris Stevenson, Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, 
and Interventions (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2009), 7. 
14 José L. Rocha, “Street Gangs of Nicaragua,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central 
America, eds. Thomas Bruenau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 2011), 108. 
15 Win Savenije and Chris van der Borgh, “Gang Violence in Central America: Comparing Anti-gang 




urbanization, migration, decentralization, little family structure, and drugs, which are 
intertwined and difficult to separate.17 To combat the gangs’ proliferation,  
Central American governments enacted policies to fight their aggression. Unfortunately, 
the policies have not had the effect that was expected, nor required, to subdue the level of 
criminal violence in El Salvador. Sonja Wolf argues in “Street Gangs of El Salvador” that 
the gang problem has become worse over the first decade since the end of the civil war, 
largely due to the government’s delay in responding to the increase in crime.18 Adding to 
the delay, the ideological policies imposed by the elites that ran the government in the 
ARENA Party highlighted issues of ineptness in handling public security. 
The authoritarian legacies of the public security sector countered criminal 
violence with state violence to match the viciousness of the gangs in the attempt to bring 
order to violent-plagued urban neighborhoods. José Miguel Cruz, in “Criminal Violence 
and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State,” argues that 
public security reforms that were introduced during the political transitions were 
instrumental in the ability of the new democratic governments to control the violence 
created by their own institutions, as well as their agents.19 This article focuses on aspects 
of the political transition process that allowed for violent entrepreneurs to continue as 
private security firms with a relationship with democratic governing elites. The private 
security firms have outnumbered the military and civil police combined.20 This ensured 
their survival, and maintained their connections with powerful foreign actors with 
considerable political influence, usually from the United States. After no official codified 
policies to address criminal violence, El Salvador’s President Flores called on the 
National Assembly to enact the Mano Dura policies. 
                                                 
17 Savenije and Van Der Borgh, “Youth Gangs, Social Exclusion,”155. 
18 Sonja Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador.” In Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central 
America, eds. Thomas Bruenau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 2011), 43. 
19 José M. Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the 
Violent State,” in Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 1–33. 
20 Marcela Donadío, ed., Índice de Seguridad Pública: Centroamérica: Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de 
América Latina, 2013): 65. 
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3. The Iron Hand Approach—Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura 
In the Northern Triangle, the policy of choice to address the spread of violence 
and gang proliferation has been the heavy-handed approach that began with the  
Mano Dura policies. Mano Dura policies were the anti-gang measures that were enacted 
by the Flores administration in 2003. The subsequent Saca administration in 2004 
followed through with the Super Mano Dura policies that were more ruthless. The Saca 
administration mostly focused on profiling anyone who may be gang affiliated and 
imprisoned these affiliates as well as any gang members. Sonja Wolf claims that the 
Super Mano Dura policies implemented in El Salvador were not only bad, but 
spectacularly ineffective.21 Despite the security focus on incarcerating and imprisoning 
youths that appeared to be gang members, the homicide rate escalated. Gangs avoided 
apprehension by adapting to the repression. The gangs adapted through tougher 
initiations and changing their appearances by moving away from requiring tattoos that 
signified a member’s allegiance, and using higher caliber weapons. The confinement in 
special prisons allowed gang members of different levels of experience to bond, increase 
cohesion among their gang, learn from more seasoned gang veterans, and establish a 
structure that would not have been attainable as quickly if it were not for the high level of 
apprehensions. The increased incarcerations also inadvertently led to an increase in 
extortions, especially in the transportation sector, by gang members and their families to 
support the prisoners because it was the family’s responsibility—not the state’s—to 
ensure that basic needs were met for each prisoner. 
The results of Super Mano Dura fail to fulfill the intent of the policies when they 
are first initiated by the Salvadoran government. Dr. Mo Hume, senior lecturer at the 
School of Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, argues in “Mano Dura: 
El Salvador Responds to Gangs,” that the Super Mano Dura strategy employed by the 
Salvadoran government serves to reveal how fragile the democratic consolidation 
actually is, exposing the authoritarian legacy that remains a large part of political life in 
                                                 
21 Sonja Wolf, Mano Dura: Gang Suppression in El Salvador. Sustainable Security, last modified 
March 2011, http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/mano-dura-gang-sppression-el-salvador. 
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El Salvador after the political transition from civil war to peace.22 Hume goes on to 
describe the government’s Super Mano Dura policies and approach through its heavy-
handed tactics to decrease gang chaos, with few positive results. Though the theory that 
getting gang members off the streets would decrease crime, since there would be fewer 
gangsters around to commit crimes, the rehabilitation portion should have been 
established while incarcerated to convert criminals into functioning members of society. 
Rehabilitation was not a focus of the jails, and as a result, prisons became finishing 
schools for young criminals. These young petty criminals go back out into society, better 
trained and with a larger criminal network to operate in, creating more crime. Mark 
Ungar argues that Super Mano Dura is a result of promising reforms that are hindered at 
the political, legal, and functional levels. As a result, community policing is required to 
overcome those obstacles at every level in order to fulfill the reforms.23 Table 2 
represents the reported statistics on homicides in El Salvador during the Super Mano 
Dura era. 
Table 2.   Homicide Rates during Super Mano Dura (2003–2011).24 
VIOLENT CRIME STATISTICS (PER 100,000 PEOPLE) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Homicide 36.4 45.8 62.2 64.4 57.1 51.7 70.9 64.1 69.9 
 
4. The Gang Truce 
Despite the efforts of the El Salvadoran governments that enacted the Mano Dura 
and Super Mano Dura policies, the data on homicides in Table 2 demonstrated that these 
policies were just not working to decrease homicide rates. As a result, a gang truce was 
initiated. The gang truce was organized unofficially by David Munguía Payés, a retired 
                                                 
22Mo Hume, “Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs,” Development in Practice 17, no. 6 
(November 2007): 739. 
23 Mark Ungar, “La Mano Dura: Current Dilemmas in Latin American Police Reform,” in 
Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, eds. Mercelo Bergman 
and Laurence Whitehead, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2009), 93. 
24 United Nations Office of Drug and Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data 
(Vienna, Austria: United Nations, 2013), 126. 
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general who became Minister of Public Security and Justice as well as Minister of 
Defense in the Funes administration along with the assistance of members of the church 
and nongovernment organization representatives.25 This gang truce did lead to a drop in 
the homicide rate, but that statistic is misleading as other forms of criminal violence, such 
as extortions and sexual violence, stayed at high levels. Mabel González Bustelo argues 
that the gang truce negotiated with the two biggest gangs in El Salvador may have been 
imperfect and generated controversy from the administration’s opposition; however, there 
are positive lessons that must be learned amid the current growing crisis of violence since 
the end of the truce.26 The gang truce did lead to a drop in homicides, but other offenses 
stayed the same or increased, which were masked by the much publicized homicide rates. 
The results worsened citizens’ perception of an ineffective government response. The 
effect of the truce was not enough to persuade the incoming administration, the second 
consecutive leftist Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) Party representative, to 
further pursue the truce. 
5. Institutional Arguments—El Salvador Seguro 
After taking office on June 1, 2014, President Salvador Sanchéz Cerén faced 
several challenges to include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and the need for tax 
reform. Sonja Wolf argues that Cerén’s agenda should revolve around strengthening 
institutions.27 That would in turn protect businesses from being extorted. She argues that 
Cerén should also build investigative capacity to enhance the criminal justice system; 
modernize prisons to improve management and rehabilitation; garner elite support to 
push forward post-war institutional reforms that strengthen state agencies to respond to 
                                                 
25 Clare R. Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, (CRS Report No. R43616) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 9, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/ 
metadc689184/m1/1/high_res_d/R43616_2015May19.pdf. 
26 Mabel G. Bustelo, “El Salvador’s Gang Truce: A Lost Opportunity?” Sustainable Security, last 
accessed May 30, 2015, http://sustainablesecurity.org/2015/05/20/el-salvador-gang-truce-a-lost-
opportunity/. 
27 Sonja Wolf, “The Security Agenda for El Salvador’s New President,” Security Sector Reform 
Resource Centre, July 2, 2014, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/07/02/the-security-agenda-for-el-
salvadors-new-president/, 2–3. 
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the needs of its citizens; that support a culture of prevention, and move beyond violence 
inherited from an authoritarian legacy. 
E. BACKGROUND 
El Salvador’s gang violence became its most immediate security concern, as the 
country and the rest of the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras and Guatemala dealt 
with the internal issue with criminal organizations or gangs since the mid-1990s. Upon 
his election as El Salvador’s president, Salvador Sanchéz Cerén (2014-present) convened 
the CNSCC, a council made up from several sectors of society including the government, 
the church, private businesses, and grassroots organizers, tasking them with developing a 
societal solution to criminal violence as a result of gang activities. In January 2015, 
President Cerén presented to the public, the CNSCC’s results as the  
124-point El Salvador Seguro (“Safe El Salvador”) Plan. It is an ambitious five-year plan 
that would be carried out in the country’s 50 most violent municipalities and in prisons. 
These are the municipalities where the country’s biggest gangs—Mara Salvatrucha  
(MS-13), and Calle 18 (18th Street)—have proliferated over the last 20 years. The new 
plan seeks to curb the violence in the country that has not been diminished by the 
previous plans of Mano Dura (Iron Hand), Super Mano Dura (Super Iron Hand), and the 
Gang Truce of 2012. What were the previous administrations’ Super Mano Dura policies, 
and why didn’t violent crime decrease in El Salvador? 
El Salvador’s significant gang problem is produced mostly by its the two largest 
criminal organizations—Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street. These organizations have a 
long reach—not only in El Salvador, but throughout Central and North America as well. 
These criminal gangs either have connections in the United States or emigrate from El 
Salvador and operate drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking 
enterprises. The policies that deal with this menace have a direct effect on the United 
States due to the transnational nature of the criminal networks. If the situation in El 
Salvador does not improve and youth gangs are not encouraged to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate into civil society, then citizens are likely to flee the crisis brought on by these 
criminal organizations. The state’s failure to improve the security situation may lead to 
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more migrations away from El Salvador, most likely to the United States through 
Guatemala and Mexico. 
Scholarly work about the gang problem in Central America that addresses it as a 
security risk is relatively new. Dr. Thomas Bruneau, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus 
of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and editor of Maras: Gang 
Violence and Security in Central America, defines what maras and gangs are and the 
security risk they have become in the region. He discusses the birth of the gang Mara 
Salvatrucha in Los Angeles, made up of Salvadoran immigrants who were refugees from 
war-torn El Salvador.28 He states that unlike the United States, the weak, 
postauthoritative governments in Central America of Guatemala, Honduras, and  
El Salvador lacked crime prevention policies to prevent gang proliferation. Maras 
explains in detail the problems that originated with the rivalry of the gangs in  
Los Angeles. The gang MS-13 formed to defend themselves from the more established 
18th Street gang members that were primarily of Mexican descent, yet the irony in that is 
that Salvadoran immigrants also joined 18th Street, and as they were deported they took 
their gang culture and rivalries with them which added to the gang violence in  
El Salvador. A cultural tolerance for violence allowed these gangs to commit criminal 
violence as a mode of operation in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, known as the 
Northern Triangle of Central America, which challenges these states’ ability to govern. 
Al Valdez, a professor on gang sociology and psychology at the University of 
California in Irvine, discusses the origins and evolution of youth gangs in Southern 
California—the epicenter for the proliferation of the gangs to Central America.29 Valdez 
argues that the growing role of drugs in gang culture affects every level of society, from 
the local street level where they are sold on the corners, to the international stage where 
trafficking is supported by the Mexican cartels. This globalization of gang activity was a 
                                                 
28Thomas Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. 
Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 
23. 
29 Al Valdez, “The Origins of Southern California Latino Gangs,” in Maras: Gang Violence and 
Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2011), 23. 
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consequence of both law enforcement practices and a criminal enterprise taking 
advantage of the illegal market for this contraband. The various pressures from peers to 
commit crimes, from society to be ostracized, and the law pressuring them to be seem as 
criminals shaped the current gang culture and its evolution into the conglomerate of 
transnational trafficking in arms, drugs, and humans throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Central America 
found that the most commonly identified reason for immigrants leaving El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras is crime and violence.30 The GAO report on Unaccompanied 
Children estimates that more than 50,000 unaccompanied minors were detained at the 
U.S. southern border in 2014.The research question analyzes the previous policies 
dealing with El Salvadoran gang activity that sprouted from those Los Angeles streets 
and the prospect for success of the government’s new policies in deterring criminal 
violence and improving the public security situation. The United States appropriated 
$803 million between 2008 and 2011 through the Central American Regional Security 
Initiative (CARSI) alone to address security concerns and develop collaborative 
partnerships in the region.31 More recently, covering the period from fiscal year 2008 
through fiscal year 2013, the GAO found that U.S. agencies allocated over $1.2 billion to 
support both CARSI and non-CARSI funding that supported achieving CARSI goals.32 
With the amount of aid that goes to Central American countries, it is important to 
know that these countries have a plan to allocate these funds responsibly to improve the 
security situation; thus preventing a crisis that would undoubtedly become a further 
burden to the United States. Policies that were enacted in the past failed due to several 
                                                 
30 David Gootnick, “U.S. GAO—Central America: Information on Migration of Unaccompanied 
Children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.” Government Accountability Office, (Washington, 
DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2015), 4. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-
362. 
31 Peter J. Meyer and Clare R. Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and 
Policy Issues for Congress, (CRS Report No. R41731) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), 82. 
32 Charles M. Johnson, Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding 
Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving Interagency Objectives (GAO Report No. 
GAO-13-771). (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2013), 9. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658145.pdf. 
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factors, including authoritarian legacy practices from public security forces. The political 
pressures during the electoral seasons added to the failure to promote social portions of 
those policies and only focused on the apprehension and imprisonment aspect of  
Super Mano Dura. Will renewed focus and proper financial appropriation of proposed 
policies in the $2.1 billion El Salvador Seguro Plan improve the security situation and 
decrease violence? 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To evaluate whether El Salvador Seguro can succeed in decreasing crime 
compared to Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura, this thesis will first determine what the 
statistical levels of criminal violence were from 2003 to 2014 under Super Mano Dura 
and how softer approaches to crime have fared under similar circumstances. I will show 
the rise in homicide rate after the implementation of Super Mano Dura, and then I will 
compare other forms of violent crime other than homicides when the drop in the 
homicide rate during the Gang Truce masks the consistent levels of the other forms of 
crime. I will then examine the first year of El Salvador Seguro’s implementation and 
compare the approaches to each of these policies as well as the statistics, determining 
which course of action would be best to decrease violent crime El Salvador. This thesis 
will review primary sources such as the Congressional Research Service (CRS), reports 
from the GAO, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports on 
El Salvador, and secondary sources from experts who have studied the gangs and use 
their views on society’s perception of criminal violence to set a baseline by which this 
thesis will establish a hypothesis on whether the situation will improve or not. This thesis 
will then discuss how these policies differ from each other and which similarities should 
be focused on to have the greatest effect in civil society and bring about positive change. 
The aim is to break down the past policies to establish what is required for a brighter 
future, and the likelihood of it. 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter II describes the conditions that 
allowed the rise of criminal violence committed by the young gangs and the state 
response of implementing repressive, authoritative policies during the ARENA 
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administrations. Chapter III analyzes the Gang Truce of 2012, as it is a brief period with 
results that seemed to lower homicides, but not crime overall, and the phase prior to 
implementation of the Safe El Salvador Plan, or Plan El Salvador Seguro. Chapter IV 
describes Plan El Salvador Seguro in detail; a 124-point policy plan to combat criminal 
violence using more societal aspects and downplaying authoritative habits from previous 
administrations, including funding and the sources of appropriations for the estimated 
$2.1 billion strategy. Chapter V will conclude by comparing the differences and 
similarities between Super Mano Dura and El Salvador Seguro, explaining the 
hypothesis about the expected results of the new emphasis on societal issues in  
El Salvador Seguro, and the crime statistics comparing the first year of each plan in order 
to project whether the shift is a positive or negative step in protecting civil society from 
the ills of these transnational criminal networks and the instability that they cause. 
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II. EL SALVADOR’S GANGS AND MANO DURA POLICIES 
The rise of youth gangs is the biggest security risk facing the El Salvador since 
the end of their civil war. Although the existence of gangs in El Salvador is documented 
as far back as the 1960s, gang activity rapidly increased in the 1990s through the present 
day.33 The gangs developed but went unnoticed by the government as a result of the 
security vacuum that existed after the peace treaties were signed in 1993.34 The Peace 
Accords may have ended hostilities between the military government and the guerrillas, 
but it marked the beginning of rising domestic threat to civil society from gangs. Due to 
the relative speed in calming hostilities after the civil war, it led to transitioning the 
insurgent communist group FMLN into a legitimate political party, the Salvadoran peace 
process has been viewed as a relative success in the way it ended the civil war and curbed 
political violence.35 
In the aftermath of the civil war, there were a lot of war-weary youths that were 
numb to the violence that surrounded them for more than a dozen years. The rise in 
insecurity is attributed to the lack of attention given to the root causes of violent crime 
that these youths had to deal with in unemployment, social exclusion, and poverty with 
no prospects for alternative lifestyles presented at the outset of the peace.36 To add to the 
environment of these impoverished youths there were gangsters being imported from the 
United States. These criminals offered an attractive way of life that involved camaraderie 
and fast ways of making money, albeit illegally. The Peace Accords of Cojutepeque in 
1992 built new institutions but did not go far enough to build back up Salvadoran society. 
As a result, few jobs were available, which affected the poorer population the most 
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during the transition period.37 Poor integration of the guerrillas into all ranks of the police 
highlighted a lack of civil control at the strategic level. As a result, there was an influx of 
expatriated criminals, a culture of violence bred from over a decade of youths witnessing 
the atrocities of war. The quickest route out of poverty for more and more young 
Salvadoran citizens seemed to be crime.38 
In the same spirit of a quick fix, the Salvadoran government began to 
acknowledge the problem of the gangs on the street and the rising criminal violence in 
the streets of the capital. In 2003, President Flores implemented the Mano Dura policies, 
based on a strategy used in urban populations in the United States. This chapter argues 
that during the ARENA Party administrations, these policies were not successful in 
decreasing violent crime, caused more harm than good by its focus on using harsh tactics 
by security forces that threatened the rule of law, did not address key social aspects in its 
attempt at decreasing crime, and needed to be replaced by other policies that would 
address the issues of the root social causes in the first place. This chapter will also 
describe the origins of the Mano Dura policies, the root causes that drove the Flores 
administration to implement these policies, and which of those root causes were actually 
addressed by the actions of the Salvadoran security forces. 
A. POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD 
1. El Salvador’s Stalemate, Peace, and Political Transition 
El Salvador experienced a civil war from the late 1970s until the United Nations 
brokered a deal, which ended the stalemate between the ARENA-led authoritarian 
government and the insurgents. When the Peace Accords were finalized in 1992, it 
signified the end of over a dozen years of conflict in this small, but populous, Central 
American country. The Peace accords would cause ripple effects for decades to come. 
For over 12 years, a whole generation of youth had been surrounded by the violence of 
war and had witnessed gruesome acts done by both sides to influence the tide of the war. 
                                                 
37 Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Maras: Gang Violence, 11. 
38 José M. Cruz, “Government Responses and the Dark Side of Gang Suppression in Central 
America,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia 
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The conflict was marred by hundreds of human rights violations and an estimated 70,000 
deaths.39 The political transition would require the full attention of the domestic and 
international community in order to make it a success, leading to a security vacuum in 
dealing with other aspects of civil society, namely a crime rate that was on the rise. With 
the reshuffling of the military and police forces to accommodate the integration of 
guerrilla forces into their ranks, the focus was more on these forces than it was on the 
populace. All this would come to a head from the mid-1990s to the present. 
2. The Rise of Violent Crime in El Salvador 
Just as significant were the millions of refugees that fled the violence, most of 
whom headed north through Guatemala toward either Mexico, the United States, or 
beyond, in search for a better way of life.40 Among the refugees were children that were 
affected immensely by the deteriorating situation in their home country, absorbing the 
brutal nature of the war. The tactics witnessed would be repeated by some of them in the 
future, showcasing their viciousness in the crimes committed by some who would 
commit felonies in the United States. These juveniles would end up joining gangs for a 
myriad of reasons and would eventually end up being deported by the United States in 
the mid-1990s, both for their crimes and their status as undocumented citizens. As they 
were removed from the United States, these pandilleros, or gangsters, would export their 
brand of maras along with them and allowing their criminal undertakings to proliferate 
throughout El Salvador and the rest of Central America. 
The United States has “over 1.9 million misplaced Salvadorians migrants.”41 
Most of them would reach the western shores of California and many would plant roots 
in Los Angeles in the 1980s. They would end up establishing themselves in some of the 
poorest neighborhoods, looking for affordable housing since these refugees would arrive 
with little or no money. This was particularly true if the immigrants had to pay someone 
to get them across Mexico and into the United States. There are several problems that 
                                                 
39 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, 1. 
40 Washington Office on Latin America , “Gangs in El Salvador,” 1. 
41 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, 14. 
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families had to overcome while living in impoverished neighborhoods. There were a lot 
of obstacles that faced these immigrants that escaped their war-torn country to enter a 
new land. The United States had not traditionally been so welcoming to new diasporas 
perceived to be attempting to take opportunities away from those already settled there. 
Whether due to employment, education, or social acceptance, these refugees had to find 
ways to assimilate into their new country and solve these challenges for the betterment of 
their lives and those of their families. Employment consist of long hours for adults, and 
schooling for their children would prove difficult without the guidance of a senior that 
understood the struggles they were going through in trying to fit into their new 
surroundings. Influence from peers would prove to be a major factor in shaping how they 
would adapt to their new surroundings, more so than the parents that sacrificed 
everything to get their young children into the country. A number of these impressionable 
youth would end up wasting their parents’ sacrifice and would fall prey to the distractions 
that are ever present on the streets in the form of gangs, or maras. 
a. 18th Street Gang and the Mara Salvatrucha in Los Angeles 
Gangs in Los Angeles that existed prior to the mass exodus of refugees from El 
Salvador, such as the 18th Street gang, would recruit these new youth into the 
neighborhood and indoctrinate them into a life of crime. As one of the older, Chicano 
groups made up of Latinos of Mexican descent, 18th Street would recruit Salvadoran 
youngsters early on as a way of building their gangs and protecting each other from other 
gangs of other ethnicities that would have been hostile to the Salvadorans; mistaking 
them for Mexicans without bothering to find out the difference.42 As gangsters, they 
harassed other youths, especially some of the other immigrant youngsters that may not 
have been affiliated with a gang. The harassment of Salvadorans by the predominately 
Mexican gangs created animosity between these two national groups living as neighbors 
in inner-city Los Angeles communities. These youngsters would then band together and 
create their own gang, known as the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. 
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From the beginning, these two gangs have been rivals. While 18th Street was the 
more established gang in Los Angeles, the growing number of Salvadoran refugees 
meant that there would also be a growing number of children among these refugees, 
which were the main recruits for MS-13. This rivalry would lead 18th Street to recruit 
more Salvadoran immigrants, as these two would grow to a size that made them 
formidable and difficult to ignore as the two fastest-growing gangs in Los Angeles. 
Gangs would commit acts of crime in order to raise funds for their members and continue 
to pursue other illicit activities, such as buying and selling narcotics, guns, and 
contraband of various kinds. These enterprising entities would compete for territory to 
further their own dealings that would benefit their individual practices, leading to bloody, 
sometimes deadly, confrontations. As these gang members were arrested for their crimes, 
the felonies that they were found to have committed would expose that they were 
undocumented immigrants to the United States. When found to not be a U.S. citizen, 
these felons would be deported back to their birth country. 
b. Criminal Deportation from the United States 
They would garner attention not just from law enforcement, but from Congress 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as well.43 In 1996, Congress 
passed the IIRIRA that authorized mass deportations of undocumented immigrants with 
criminal convictions.44 The U.S. government began to increase the number of these 
refugees that were expelled back to El Salvador if they were determined to have criminal 
records. As reported by the INS in 1997, the United States deported 2,734 of these 
undocumented immigrants back to El Salvador.45 The following year, the United States 
deported 3,865, of which 1,538 were known to be criminals, but the government of El 
Salvador was still dealing with the political transition and was not prepared to handle the 
influx of these criminals being flown in from the United States. The deportees—despite 
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being born in El Salvador—knew nothing of the country, since most had fled with their 
families when they were very young.46 As these criminals were deported, they were very 
much involved in their gang life and the ways of the maras, which they exported with 
them to Central America that may have had some gang activity in the past, but not at the 
level that was being imported from the United States. The customs, clothes, and 
guidelines that they took with them to El Salvador and other Central American countries 
were seen as attractive to the youth in these South American countries. The increase in 
gang members from the United States made for fertile recruiting grounds to help build the 
MS-13 and 18th Street brand on the streets of their new neighborhoods in El Salvador. 
c. Proliferation 
Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gang, or Barrio 18, would proliferate and 
develop networks in El Salvador and the United States due to being deported.47 The 
combination of youth that were raised in the middle of the civil war and those that 
survived the hardship of fleeing to the United States, but ended up being deported back to 
El Salvador would prove to be difficult to handle for Salvadoran society in the mid-
1990s. These growing gangs would be the main antagonists to the rise of violence by 
gang members in El Salvador, which would ultimately resemble those gangs in  
Los Angeles. The spread of these gangs would affect other countries in Central America 
besides El Salvador, as gang membership would reach over 10,000 in each of the 
Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These gangs 
would continue to grow their operations as well, participating in the drug trade, as well as 
human trafficking, and would develop beyond first-generation gangs and well into 
second-generation, tight-knit organizations, even exemplifying third-generation 
characteristics. 
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B. THE CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MANO DURA POLICIES 
The Mano Dura policies were a version of other tough-on-crime policies outside 
of El Salvador. The policy, first described as the “broken windows” policy, was based on 
an article by Dr. Geoure L. Kelling and Dr. James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows: The 
Police and Neighborhood Safety,” in The Atlantic magazine in 1982.48 The authors 
described their findings in the difference between neighborhoods with police on foot 
patrols and those with police officers in motor vehicles; how the perception of safety led 
to a perceived increase in public safety; and, ultimately, led to a decrease in crime in the 
neighborhoods with foot patrols.49 These police officers, with their presence alone, would 
change the perception of the citizens of the community, even if their presence did not 
have a direct effect on the actual level of crime on the street. The fear stemming from not 
having a calming presence on the Street made citizens believe that they did not live in a 
safe neighborhood; yet, even in communities riddled with crime, citizens felt safer when 
police foot patrols were conducted. These officers would ensure that minor infractions 
were dealt with and that regular citizens knew as much so they would be willing 
participants as either witnesses or sources of information on possible infractions. 
In New York, this policy of foot patrols was implemented by then  
Police Commissioner William Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in the 1990s to 
combat the high levels of violent crime at the beginning of their administration, and the 
results had been viewed as controversial, yet successful. They were first put into effect in 
the United States, in Los Angeles and New York, to combat the growing violent crime 
that had riddled those cities for years and resulted in decreased levels of violent crime 
since their inception. Essentially, it involved dealing with perpetrators of any small 
infraction in a quick and harsh manner. Whether it was dealing with jaywalkers or graffiti 
artists, the point was to make an example of these law breakers to discourage others from 
following suit and, in the process, either build cases on those guilty of minor infractions 
to track them as the years go by or arrest criminals that have warrants out that would not 
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have been found otherwise.50 Researchers have argued that this is not the case and that 
the drop in crime was following a national trend attributed to an economic boom in the 
decade after the end of the Cold War. Although this new policing effort may have 
contributed somewhat to the dramatic decline of crime in New York compared to the rest 
of the country, there is no agreed upon sole reason why it happened. 
1. Mano Dura to Super Mano Dura 
The government of El Salvador had to do something about the proliferation of the 
maras. The ARENA Party had maintained its hold on the presidency since the end of the 
civil war, while the level of violent crime rose. Due to the rise in violence, some argued 
that the party had to give the impression of being tough on crime to maintain the 
presidency in the election of 2003. Action was taken to address this concern during the 
administration of President Francisco Flores, with the subsequent anti-gang laws known 
as the Mano Dura policies.51 These policies were meant to curb not only violence, but 
also focus on the societal aspects of it in order to draw vulnerable youths away from a life 
of crime in exchange for a sense of purpose, of belonging, and toward a life that may 
contribute to society in a positive way. Unfortunately, the security emphasis took center 
stage and blunted any effort to appeal to misguided youth, concentrating on incarceration 
and imprisoning gang members instead, in an attempt to decrease violent crime in the 
region, while strengthening the reputation of the Iron Hand moniker of the policies. The 
appearance of the party being tough on crime and the gangs boosted the ARENA cause to 
maintain the presidency, and Antonio Saca was elected, becoming the fourth straight 
elected official from the ARENA Party to win the presidency. To continue to earn praise 
for being tough on crime, President Saca’s administration went even further with the anti-
gang laws and implemented Super Mano Dura. Super Mano Dura would have grave 
results and lead El Salvadoran society to lose its grasp on the rule of law when trying to 
decrease the level of violent crime in El Salvador. The media played a crucial role in 
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heaping praise on the new plane, and demonizing gangs in order to push forward the anti-
gang agendas of these two presidents.52 
2. The Flores Administration 
The Mano Dura policies were established as a result of the violent crime that had 
been on the rise since the end of the civil war and to combat the proliferation of the 
maras. They were the successors to the Leyes Antimaras, or antigang laws.53 Prior to 
Mano Dura, these policies consisted of a patchwork of laws that expired over time, which 
was all that the government could muster for these anti-mara laws, and were only 
codified to assist the police in their attempts to apprehend gang members.54 They were a 
response and the ARENA Party had to show that they were tough on crime to gain 
political momentum entering an election year. The administration of President Flores put 
forth the policy change so that the party could appear tough on crime. The effort put forth 
by the security forces in combating crime by youth gangs is credited with securing the 
win for the party in the elections. It consisted of area sweeps by security forces that were 
joint operations between the military and police, and allowed the arrest of gangsters 
based on their appearance alone. 
Known as Mano Dura, the translation and literal meaning is “Iron Hand.” These 
policies were harsh in nature and designed to not only curb violence but also the 
attraction that crime enjoyed during the decade after the end of the civil war. The 
thinking behind such harsh policies is that if all the criminals were taken off of the streets 
then. The ARENA Party, known as the wards of conservative principles in El Salvador, 
was determined to get tough on crime or risk losing to the FMLN Party in the 2003 
election. Their policies rode a wave of populist approval for the ARENA Party, leading to 
victory for their party’s candidate, Antonio Saca. 
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3. The Saca Administration and Super Mano Dura 
After Antonio Saca won the election, his administration reinforced the  
Mano Dura policies and introduced what was then called the Super Mano Dura policies. 
These regulations would allow the police the opportunity to remove a citizen’s rights 
based on their appearance alone. They would be able to question and incarcerate a 
suspected gang member based on whether they were dressed like a pandillero or had 
visible tattoos that would associate them with any of the gangs. This was a gross violation 
of human rights and hindered the rule of law for juveniles in the name of public 
security—a gross miscalculation by the Saca government. It did get gang members into a 
database, but the resources to put them in jail and the wasted man hours to incarcerate 
without any evidence removed legitimacy from the Super Mano Dura policies. 
In the years since the policies have been in place, the homicide rate has remained 
one of the worst in the region.55 Super Mano Dura has required the use of the military to 
patrol jointly with the police; a gross violation of the Peace Accords in the Chapultepec 
Agreement and the Salvadoran constitution as well. El Salvadoran presidents have been 
able to circumvent this requirement by presidential decree, although according to some 
doing so has only added to illegitimacy of these policies. The added militarization, and 
the media attention that comes with it, puts the focus on the government’s efforts to 
reduce crime, making it appear to be tough on criminals. In actuality, the policies are in 
place to protect the Salvadoran elites and maintain the status quo. The fact that the 
homicide rates and violent crime has not decreased significantly are signs that the 
government is not doing enough by only focusing on the internal security aspect of 
dealing with the gangs, and that it needs to find a different approach if they are to actually 
be successful, or this course of failure will continue well into the next generation. 
Super Mano Dura was more of the same under Antonio Saca’s administration. 
The numbers are compelling, and the gross violations of the rule of law are the legacy 
that has been inherited by the subsequent administration. Super Mano Dura outlawed the 
mere membership of being in a gang, allowed for the arrest of anyone that appeared to be 
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in a gang, and used superficial evidence to apprehend suspected pandilleros, such as 
tattoos or very loose clothing, which are a common appearance for gang members. The 
result of the crackdown on the youths was an actual rise in the violent crime rate. 
Homicides went up, as did extortion by the maras, as well as strikes by transportation 
workers demanding more security from the government to safely run their routes. The 
violence would spread beyond the country’s borders, too, as violent crime rates would 
increase throughout the Northern Triangle, the so-called area of North Central America 
consisting of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.56 These three countries are among 
the world’s five most dangerous countries in terms of homicides per hundred thousand 
population—a dubious honor to attain. This policy would continue for a decade, and 
would be suspended at the beginning of what came to be known as the Gang Truce 
during the presidency of Mauricio Funes, his FMLN successor. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
rising homicide rate during ARENA party administrations. 
Figure 1.  Homicide rate during ARENA presidencies (2000–2009).57 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The source of the rise in crime in El Salvador after the peace accords were signed 
were gangs, operating in the security vacuum that became apparent during the political 
transition. The rise of youth gangs in El Salvador, with the proliferation of these gangs 
originating in the United States, was not expected by any of the security forces in the 
Central American region. The reason for the gangs, which were originally from  
Los Angeles, having a presence in El Salvador was due to the increased deportation of 
these gang members that were arrested in the United States after the IIRIRA in 1996. 
These young law breakers, after being arrested and tried, were found to not have any 
documentation declaring them legal residents or citizens since their arrivals as refugees 
escaping the vicious civil war as children. Upon arriving in El Salvador, they drew from 
the young disgruntled population new recruits that would continue their gangbanging 
ways with those children that had been hardened by the war they survived the previous 
dozen years. These adolescents were not afforded opportunities of employment or forms 
of improving their standing in society, and were the ideal candidates to be drawn by the 
gang life of camaraderie, fast money, and respect out of fear to the irritation of the 
government and the citizens of the state. The state did not address the root causes that 
drew thousands towards to identifying with the growing gangs such as low job creation, 
poor integration of the guerrillas and their families into the state’s security forces, and 
affording opportunities for peasants to escape poverty. 
The hypothesis H1 was that if Mano Dura is implemented, then crime will 
decrease. President Flores’ administration introduced the Mano Dura policies in 2003 to 
apprehend the gangsters responsible for the high level of violent crime. These policies 
were based mostly on the “broken windows” policy of the United States in an effort to 
create anti-mara laws. Though these laws had social aspects written into their policies to 
address the recruitment of young individuals, the actual practice of the procedures were 
mostly conducted by security forces focusing on the apprehension and incarceration of 
suspected gang members. These gang members would be imprisoned for long periods of 
time in order to keep them off the street, but what it inadvertently did was give the petty 
criminals time to be mentored by the more senior and hardened criminals, fostering an 
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environment akin to a finishing school, and releasing this trained product back out into 
the streets. For all intents and purposes, this shows that H1 was wrong; therefore, H1 was 
tried again with the revised Mano Dura in the creation of Saca’s Super Mano Dura. 
The hypothesis H2 was tested next, in order to reverse the trend and decrease 
crime. This tactic appeared to be politically driven by the ARENA Party in an effort to 
give the impression of being tough on crime prior to an election cycle. When the party 
won the presidency again in elections, the following administration added harsher 
language to the policies, what came to be known as Super Mano Dura. President Saca’s 
tenure and rhetoric led to the decrease of the rule of law in El Salvador, as security forces 
were allowed to arrest anyone they deemed appeared to look gang affiliated, a gross 
violation of human rights since suspicion of committing a crime was no longer a 
requirement for apprehending someone. Despite the crackdown, the crime rate failed to 
decrease and, in the end, the ARENA Party lost the election in 2009, when the FMLN 
candidate, Funes, won the presidency for the former guerrilla faction. So once again, that 
hypothesis with the repressive Iron Hand policies failed to come true, and a new 
approach seemed to be appropriate with a new administration in power. President Funes 
would fail to repeal Super Mano Dura during his administration, but he looked for 
alternatives to the policies in an effort to solve the riddle of decreasing violent crime 
committed by the gangs of El Salvador. This was necessary, as H2 was also wrong. 
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III. CRIME PREVENTION POLICY SHIFT DURING 
FARABUNDO MARTIN LIBERATION FRONT RULE 
The ARENA Party had been in control of the executive branch for 20 years, 
dating back to the last years of the civil war, but finally lost the presidency to the FMLN 
Party candidate, Mauricio Funes, in 2009. With a new, Left-leaning party in charge, in 
contrast to the center-right conservative ARENA Party, the opportunity presented itself 
for a different approach in combating crime across El Salvador. The question was not 
could Super Mano Dura still work, it was how do they replace the iron hand policies and 
when? To change or end the Super Mano Dura policies, the Funes administration and 
subsequent Salvador Sanchéz Cerén administration, along with the FMLN Party, needed 
time to gain more seats for a majority in the Legislative Assembly, present statistics to 
convince Salvadorans and their elected officials that the current policies were not making 
the differences that they were intended to, and argue that viable alternatives needed to be 
made to eradicate the heavy-handed policies inherited from the previous administrations. 
This chapter will describe the how the presidencies of Mauricio Funes and Salvador 
Sanchéz Cerén dealt with the Super Mano Dura policies they inherited, the results of 
these policies on the population in its attempt at curbing violent crime, and the 
alternatives that were presented, but were not officially implemented to replace Super 
Mano Dura until the second year of Cerén’s presidency. 
A. FARABUNDO MARTIN LIBERATION FRONT PARTY INHERITED 
SUPER MANO DURA 
The FMLN Party was formerly created as a result of the Peace Accords that were 
agreed upon during the United Nations mission in El Salvador, or UNOSAL, in 1992–
1993.58 Prior to the accords, the members of the party were formerly guerrilla insurgents. 
Their history goes back to 1932, when their namesake, Farabundo Marti, a leader of the 
peasantry, but recognized only as communists by the government, was murdered and the 
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peasants were massacred by military forces in what is known as La Matanza.59 These 
peasants would never forget and named their antioppressive movement after Marti during 
the civil war of the 1980s. The FMLN suffered atrocities at the hands of the military 
during the civil war, which formed death squads to carry out executions in support of the 
authoritarian government. These death squads that were formed by the government 
during the civil war would create mistrust of the military by the Leftists long after the 
war’s end. 
After the success of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, there was fear of the 
proliferation of the communist revolution on the Central American isthmus, and civil 
wars were fought in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, with mixed results. 
Thousands of refugees from this struggle would emigrate to escape the atrocities brought 
on by these conflicts. Most Salvadorans would head north to the United States and some 
would, in turn, be deported back to El Salvador in the 1990s, as discussed in Chapter II.60 
The end of the Cold War triggered an opportunity for the warring factions of the ruling 
ARENA party and the FMLN insurgents to meet under a United Nations mission to settle 
differences since the war had reached a stalemate by 1992.61 The United States was not 
formally allowed to mediate, since it was too involved in training and equipping 
Salvadoran troops during the civil war. During the United Nations mission in  
El Salvador, six peace agreements were signed between the sides to establish the FMLN 
as a political party and integrate national police force with members of the guerrillas; yet, 
socio-economic issues were not properly addressed to prevent the root causes of the 
violent crime that was becoming more and more present after 1992. 
1. The First Farabundo Martin Liberation Front President of El 
Salvador, Mauricio Funes 
The FMLN won the presidential election for the first time in 2009, more than 17 
years after laying down their arms to become a political party, with 51.2% of the vote in 
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the first round, cancelling the need for a run-off. Their candidate was Mauricio Funes, a 
journalist who had reported on the actions of the government and the military, 
influencing him to lean to the “left” politically as the war wore on, and sympathizing with 
the plight of the peasants. Funes was chosen by the FMLN to give them the best chance 
of winning the election, as he had been well known due to having a popular news show 
before entering into the electoral arena. His victory gave hope that a different approach to 
the country’s problems would be addressed from a different perspective than the 
administrations of the previous 20 years. 
Although power was transferred peacefully through democratic election for the 
first time in the country’s history, ARENA still held the majority in the Legislative 
Assembly after the 2009 elections. Until 2015, the FMLN failed to gain a majority of the 
seats in the Legislative Assembly. This required the Funes administration to build 
coalitions and compromise with the other political parties to govern the country.62 The 
lack of political capital to change policies without a mandate was an obstacle that the 
Funes administration had to address when dealing with the security issue of violent 
crime, especially with regard to youth gangs. The Mano Dura policies that they inherited 
from the Saca administration continued on without any concrete alternative presented to 
replace those hard-line policies. Despite statistics showing that violent crime in  
El Salvador was not in decline and that Super Mano Dura was not having the expected 
effect on decreasing gang crime, the policies stayed in place until 2012, well into the new 
administration. Moreover, the president had to use more forces than usual in dealing with 
the security issue, ultimately adding military escorts for patrols with the national police 
before tacitly moving forward with an unofficial truce between the two biggest gangs in 
El Salvador. 
There had been hope that an FMLN presidency would usher in new policies that 
would be more tolerant, as it was supposedly viewed to have a positive relationship with 
the gangs; yet, no real alternative was created during the first three years of the FMLN 
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presidency.63 In December 2010, the Funes administration went so far as to add another 
10,000 soldiers to assist the national police on Street patrols to prevent gang violence.64 
Figure 2 notes the homicide right during FMLN adminstrations, noting the drop in 
homicides during the Gang Truce years. 
Figure 2.  Homicides under FMLN Administrations.65 
 
 
The homicide rate was at its peak when the Funes administration entered office in 
2009, and the homicide rates would remain high for next couple of years. The situation 
was so bleak at that point, that officials from the Organization of American States were 
calling the situation an “undeclared civil war” in El Salvador.66 Combating violent crime 
needed a different approach to bring the level of homicides below typical wartime highs. 
As alternatives were being discussed among those in and out of government, the results 
dictated a change sooner rather than later to address the gang violence. The Funes 
administration would not accept the status quo of just letting the Super Mano Dura 
policies go on without a challenge. The president abolished the Youth Secretariat, as it 
appeared to be a money waster instead of tool to draw children away from the influences 
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of gangs.67 In 2011, Funes considered allowing the United Nations to conduct a criminal 
investigation against organized crime in El Salvador, following the success of the  
United Nations International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).68 
With the results of the CICIG finding guilty verdicts for 14 Los Zetas drug cartel 
members who were operating with impunity prior to the investigation, President Funes 
hoped to get the United Nations involved in the effort to reign in the high levels of 
violent crime committed by the youth gangs in El Salvador. Unfortunately, the elites 
continuously resisted structural changes from the FMLN in combating crime, declaring 
that the party was often too soft on crime, weakening the social capital of the ruling 
administration, and preventing them from gaining funds, resources, and expertise 
established in the country by not allowing any taxes to be passed that would take from the 
rich to support and implement security measures. 
a. Exploring a Gang Truce 
There was an alternative that was discussed in the form of a truce between the two 
largest gangs because the Super Mano Dura policies failed to accomplish the desired 
results. This, coupled with the heavy-handed tactics of the Super Mano Dura, 
necessitated a change in strategy to decrease violent crime among Salvadoran society. 
The Funes administration needed to demonstrate that they were not about to use 
repressive authoritarian tactics against a sector of citizens of the country, albeit criminal 
ones, since they were the ones with the history of combating such treatment at the hands 
of the government 30 years prior, and even long before that, dating back to the  
La Matanza. Although Funes had requested an investigation from the United Nations, 
there was also an approach made toward finding other means of engaging the gangs in  
El Salvador. With the help of the Catholic clergy and non-governmental organizations, 
and with unofficial advisors from the administration, meetings were held with gang 
leaders that were imprisoned at the time in maximum security prisons. They explored 
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how to move forward by using their leadership and influence, offering favors in return if 
they could positively move forward with making these goals a reality. 
B. THE GANG TRUCE 
The Funes administration took office as the homicide rate was at the previously 
stated peak of 70.9 per 100,000.69 This homicide rate was at its worst since the last year 
of the civil war, when it was 138 per 100,000 in 1991.70 Finding a way to combat crime 
in a different manner than the Super Mano Dura policies would be the best way to 
address the killings and crime in El Salvador. The administration viewed its options and 
moved forward with engaging the gangs across a negotiating table. According to reports 
the government had others who were not officials lead the efforts in reaching out to the 
imprisoned leaders of the gangs. The hope was by reaching out the gangs, the 
government could gain a sense of what was possible to achieve with the negotiations. The 
administration could not get anything through the Assembly without reaching across the 
aisle, which angered both Funes’ FMLN supporters and the right-wing conservatives that 
thought he was weak on crime. In March 2012, a truce between El Salvador’s two largest 
gangs—Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18—was finalized, as members from the church 
and nongovernmental organizations moderated to try to reduce gang-related crimes and 
violence.71 This would be the first of two truces during this administration. Government 
representatives were unofficially part of the process, so that if, by chance, the truce did 
not produce desirable results, the administration would not be held responsible for its 
failure. The truce was a softer approach at addressing the gang violence, moving away 
from repressive actions and mass incarcerations, and trying to implement social, 
educational, and job training programs in their stead.72 Deals were made between the 
stakeholders, which required trust among these actors that they would hold up their end 
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of the bargain. The gang leaders ordered the gangs to reduce the number of killings and, 
in return, these leaders were transferred to medium-security prisons in order to see their 
families and be able to interact more easily with the gang members who received  
the orders.73 
The Gang Truce was supposed to pave the way for integrating gangsters back into 
Salvadoran society. There were trial programs that would help former gang members get 
jobs and learn skills to rejoin the work force, but many times the promised funds from the 
government to run these programs was withheld or decreased, damaging trust in the 
government. The fear also rose that the status quo had changed with regard to the youth 
gangs. It had been determined that the gangs could negotiate as a political entity by using 
violence as political capital, and by using the decrease in one type of violent crime to 
mask more activity in another. When comparing homicide rates alone, it would appear 
that the Gang Truce had a positive effect, reducing murders from 69.9 per 100,000 in 
2011, to 41.2 in 2012 and 39.8 in 2013. This decline in the homicide rate had not been 
seen since the Super Mano Dura was introduced, signifying the lowest homicide rates in 
a decade. If this trend continued, it could be considered a step in the right direction in 
how to handle the gangs in the near future and make the streets safe again for ordinary 
citizens. These, however, are not the only numbers that constitute the patterns of violent 
crime present in Salvadoran society. 
Although the homicide rate dropped dramatically, other indicators of violent 
crime such as assaults, burglary, and extortions, did not follow the same pattern. In each 
of those cases, there was an increase in activity reported between 2011 and 2013, the year 
before and after the Gang Truce. This indicates that although the murder rate may have 
been lowered, it did not help to make citizens feel any safer, as they still suffered from 
criminal activity. Corners of the conservative parties, law enforcement, and the elites 
opposed to the truce argued that the homicide rate did not take into account those 
classified as “disappeared,” which, to many Salvadorans, was considered to be as good as 
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dead.74 Also, extortions and other violent crimes traumatized the citizens of the country 
during the Gang Truce. There was a growing concern about potentially empowering the 
criminal organizations with legitimacy stemming from government negotiations and 
truces, seemingly rewarding criminal behavior instead of punishing them for being law 
breakers.75 The Gang Truce may have even afforded these gangs the space to be able to 
better operate their enterprises without interruption. Others argued that the truce brought 
a reduction in killings and that it was a start for greater change by engaging the maras, 
especially since nothing else had previously worked on any level to curb the gang 
violence.76 Outside observers of the process, such as the Organization of American 
States, saw it in this positive light, as it created the Technical Committee for the 
Coordination of the Process of Violence Reduction in El Salvador. Figure 3 shows the 
rates of violent crimes other than homicide, which remain constant though there was a 
drop in homicides during the Gang Truce. 
Figure 3.  Violent Crime Other than Homicides (per 100,000).77 
 
 
                                                 























The truce between the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 has been controversial and 
less than perfect, but there were lessons to be learned from this episode. It showed that if 
the government played an active role in reaching out to the gangs and agreeing to some 
mutual terms, that positive results could be had from negotiations. It also proved that 
these gangs had created political capital from being able to control violence when 
necessary to show their soft power. It did not sit well with members of the conservative 
parties, wanting to show that the FMLN was weak against crime and emboldening the 
gangs to commit more acts of violence by taking advantage of this weakness. When the 
government tried to cancel the truce, homicides skyrocketed, and the gangs then 
approached the government in August 2014 to restart the truce, lowering the murder rate 
as a sign of progress. At this point, Cerén’s administration was not willing to negotiate 
with the gangs, since he did not believe that crime overall was being addressed by the 
Gang Truce. The reports that discuss the approach to the gang truce being about lowering 
the murder rate point to the statistics as proof that the truce was successful, but the lack of 
any broader means of addressing violent crime led leaders of the ruling party to find other 
ways to move forward beyond the Gang Truce. Alternatives would be the main topic of 
discussion in combating crime by the subsequent administration, as it shed itself from 
responsibility of the Gang Truce. The gangs felt betrayed by this switch and would 
respond in kind when the concessions they had negotiated two years earlier were revoked 
by the new administration, and a new era of violence would begin. 
C. CERÉN DISREGARDS GANG TRUCE 
In 2014, El Salvador moved further toward democratic consolidation, appearing 
internationally as a success story for peaceful political transitions 20 years after the 
signing of the peace accords. The FMLN was able to retain the presidency through the 
democratic process with their second consecutive nominee when Salvador Sanchéz Cerén 
was victorious by a slim margin over his ARENA contender. Internally, it seemed to be a 
different story, as the Cerén administration inherited the same official Super Mano Dura 
policies as the previous administration did, since the new FMLN government did not 
fully endorse the Gang Truce. Moreover, it could no longer place the blame of the issues 
of crime on the previous office holders, since the incumbent president had represented the 
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FMLN and the new president had been the vice president. With the violent crime rate still 
above pre-2003 levels, when the Mano Dura policies were introduced, and the tactics 
used by the security forces compromised the rule of law, El Salvador still faced 
legitimate challenges despite its positive democratic appearance. The party also gained 
enough seats in the Legislative Assembly to have a majority over the ARENA Party, in 
addition to being holders of the Executive Branch. 
Cerén should build on the previous administration’s “strides towards building a 
more equal and inclusive society.”78 Yet, though the homicide rate dropped during 
Cerén’s time as vice-president, the statistics on homicides mask the constant levels of 
violent crimes other than homicides that led Cerén to not recognize the gang truce 
brokered in 2012.79 At the outset of his presidency, Ceren and the FMLN Party faced 
mounting criticism from the country’s elites and the media over the apparent lack of a 
comprehensive strategy to combat violent crime. On August 29, 2014, the government 
created the community police among concerned citizens in order to try and take back the 
perception of control of neighborhoods by the citizens from the youth gangs, but it was 
not under any formal policy, so it appeared to be a temporary attempt at fighting crime.80 
Although the Gang Truce had lowered the number of homicides, the rate was still a high 
39.8 per 100,000 and that remained a cause for concern for the public, creating little 
confidence in the government’s ability to deal with what was described as an 
“uncontrollable plague” of crime by the gangs.81 To make matters worse, the 
administration still did not take any official responsibility for the truce, and so the Super 
Mano Dura was still the policy enforced by the security forces, giving the impression that 
the administration did not have control of the security environment in El Salvador. 
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Cerén’s administration wanted to permanently replace the harsh Super Mano 
Dura policies that were official legislation and wanted input on how to move forward 
from several aspects of Salvadoran society. With the political capital to be able to enact 
some permanent changes, and after being in office eight months, President Cerén called 
for the creation of a commission to find a suitable alternative as a way forward to 
improving civil society and reducing crime throughout the country that would consist of 
citizens from all walks of life that would be tasked with discussing and articulating 
alternatives to the Super Mano Dura policies in order to combat violent crime and make 
the streets of El Salvador safe again for all citizens. The council was called the Consejo 
Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia, or National Council on Citizen 
Security and Coexistence (CNSCC). Four months later, in January 2015, upon receiving 
the results of the CNSCC, President Cerén presented the results of Plan El Salvador 
Seguro to the citizens of El Salvador through the media.82 
Instead, he commissioned the CNSCC to create a comprehensive plan to decrease 
the level of criminal violence plaguing Salvadoran society.83 The plan they came up with 
was a 124-point plan, broken into five phases: violence prevention, criminal prosecution, 
rehabilitation and reintegration, care and protection for victims, and institution 
strengthening. There is very little academic research that is in-depth on El Salvador 
Seguro, as it is still being implemented and the results are to be determined. News reports 
in El Faro and El Grafico Pensa and articles written by respected academics such as 
Sonja Wolf’s “Hay Terroristas En El Salvador” describe the situation as it changes 
throughout the country.84 The indicators are not what were hoped for when the plan was 
first introduced at the beginning of the year, as it, too, has failed to decrease the  
homicide rate. 
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After reviewing the 46-page plan and searching for reports and academic work 
over the past few months, the focus of the plan addresses some of the arguments made by 
Wolf on the security agenda within the five main priorities laid out in the plan. The Plan 
argues that with the proper funding and citizen support that El Salvador Seguro can take 
a broad approach in addressing public insecurity. The five main stakes are addressed in 
124 points that address several aspects of the root causes of crime in the Salvadoran 
society, with the five priorities being violence prevention, criminal prosecution, victim 
protection and advocacy, and strengthening institutions.85 The Congressional Research 
Report by Clare Ribando Seelke, titled “El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations” 
and published in May 2015, skims the surface of the plan, calling it a holistic approach. 
The CRS report does, however, argue that the government is resorting to the repressive 
practices of before due to the sudden rise of gang violence after the redistribution of the 
prison population that included gang leaders, and the government mobilized more 
military than before for public security, calling up three Army battalions to patrol the 
streets alongside police.86 
D. CONCLUSION 
For the first time in its history, El Salvador was able to peacefully transfer power 
as a democracy from one political party to another. After the electoral loss of the ARENA 
Party candidate, Mauricio Funes became the president under the FMLN banner. Since the 
party representing the former guerrilla faction during the civil war, one that had been 
victims to numerous human rights atrocities, was in power there was reason to believe 
that the harsh Super Mano Dura policies would be replaced during this first FMLN 
presidency. Testing the first two hypotheses, it became apparent that they were wrong 
and neither Mano Dura nor Super Mano Dura policies were decreasing crime. Though 
there were important strides in creating social programs and making a more equal society 
during the Funes presidency, the issue of gang violence was not resolved. The military 
had to be called in to assist with patrols due to the continued insecurity throughout the 
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country. This lack of progress under Super Mano Dura in dealing with criminal violence 
created an opening for the Gang Truce to be created, though the government never 
officially embraced it.  
With Salvador Sanchéz Cerén taking office, Super Mano Dura policies were still 
the laws that governed how to approach the youth gang issue in trying to curb violent 
crime. Despite appearances of change brewing with the change in the executive branch, 
since the ARENA Party held the majority in the Legislative Assembly the FMLN 
administration needed to work with the other parties to pass legislation and a change in 
anti-crime laws was not probable without more support from the Legislative Assembly. 
The requirements became obvious that for change to occur through elections first for 
FMLN to earn enough political capital and seats to make any significant changes to the 
forceful policies that characterized the loss of rule of law in some corners of the country. 
After the failure of Super Mano Dura to usher in substantial decreases in violent crime, it 
was necessary for the FMLN to broadcast these results to the public and elected officials. 
The ruling party would also be required to create alternatives to Super Mano Dura, 
preferably with more emphasis on social aspects that would decrease the level of 
participation and recruitment of youths throughout the country in order to stem the 
proliferation of the gangs. For El Salvador to shake off these oppressive policies and 
strengthen the rule of law throughout its country it would be necessary that these steps 
occur and in a manner that would garner support from the citizenry, or risk the ARENA 
Party to return to power and continue with the status quo. In fact, the FMLN Party did 
win the presidency for a second term with the electoral win of Sanchéz Cerén. The 
alternatives to Super Mano Dura were first presented in the form for an unofficial attempt 
at a Gang Truce, which failed to take stronger hold among those in government to fully 
support. After the former vice president was elected as the chief executive, Salvador 
Sanchéz Cerén created a committee that presented to him the policies he would go on and 
promote as the real shift away from Super Mano Dura, the 124-point El Salvador Seguro 
Plan, that laid out what was considered the best course of action in trying to combat 
violent crime, while assisting victims of the crime, rehabilitating ex-gangsters, and 
providing alternatives to gang life for those youths in areas where they are heavily 
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recruited by the maras. The point of the plan was to replace Super Mano Dura, making it 
obsolete and essentially nonexistent. Enter the third hypothesis, where El Salvador 
Seguro’s implementation decreases violent crime. 
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IV. PLAN EL SALVADOR SEGURO 
A. MOVING ON FROM THE PAST INTO THE PRESENT 
On January 15, 2015, President Cerén announced to the media the first 
comprehensive approach to tackling violent crime in a dozen years.87  
Two options, that are potential solutions to reducing the gang violence, are the 
gang truce in 2012 and Plan El Salvador Seguro in 2015. The government moved away 
from Super Mano Dura because the government needed to: 
 decrease homicides by introducing a truce among the two biggest gangs in 
El Salvador; 
 halt the use harsh tactics against gangsters; 
 address the social aspect of the root causes of crime that was ignored 
under Super Mano Dura; and 
 provide jobs and other alternatives to draw away potential recruits from 
gangs in order to stop their proliferation. 
The Gang Truce was a temporary agreement orchestrated by nongovernmental 
organizations, the church, and unofficially supported by President Mauricio Funes’ 
administration, to reach out to the imprisoned leaders of the two largest gangs in  
El Salvador.88 Since the gang truce results were mixed, the government shied away from 
taking official credit for the drop in homicides. The end result was that the violent crime 
rate did not drop and, therefore, the truce ended in March 2014.89 When Funes’  
Vice President, Salvador Sanchéz Cerén, won the presidential election in June 2014, he 
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completely disregarded trying to revive the gang truce, ending any hope of establishing a 
second truce.90 
President Cerén commissioned a committee, the CNSCC, which was tasked with 
creating recommendations to present to the Legislative Assembly to forge a new path to 
decrease violent crime in El Salvador. The recommendations would move El Salvador 
away from the legacy of Super Mano Dura. The CNSCC created a five-year plan meant 
to address the root causes of violent crime, focusing on crime prevention instead of 
incarceration. My paper’s argument is that Plan El Salvador Seguro will be more 
successful in the next five years in decreasing crime than Super Mano Dura was in the 
previous dozen years, due to the attention El Salvador Seguro gives to addressing the root 
causes of crime, instead of trying to stamp it out with mass incarcerations for anyone 
gang affiliated, the way that Super Mano Dura was executed. This chapter argues that 
although Plan El Salvador Seguro was well thought out and created an admirable 
blueprint to prevent violent crime, the lack of coordination with the youth gangs and the 
priority placed on redistribution of prisoners has caused a spike in violence. This spike is 
contrary to the existence of the new policies, diminishing the Cerén administration’s 
ability to effectively decrease violent crime without using repressive tactics. The Cerén 
administration may still accomplish its strategic goals if properly funded and supported 
by the citizens of El Salvador. This chapter will introduce the creation of the CNSCC 
during the Cerén administration and President Cerén’s comprehensive Plan El Salvador 
Seguro, and how it is meant to decrease violent crime by targeting youth programs and 
social aspects of society. 
B. COUNCIL FOR CITIZENS’ SECURITY AND EL SALVADOR SEGURO 
Upon being elected in June 2014, President Cerén did not pursue a second gang 
truce, as the pandilleros had pushed for, and, instead, commissioned a committee to look 
into how to best approach curbing violent crime. He asked them to present policy 
alternatives other than the Super Mano Dura policies. The CNSCC was commissioned in 
September 2014, which consisted of church members, the media, business leaders, and 
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members of the international community.91 One of the most publicized participants was 
former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, credited with leading the decrease in violent 
crime in his city during his term in office.92 With the participation of people from 
different walks of life, the CNSCC was determined to create policies that would affect all 
aspects of society, to include not just security, but also social programs, as an alternative 
to gangs for young people who might not have any other options otherwise. 
The principal objectives of the CNSCC were:  
 to get participation from different sectors of society to engage in a 
dialogue  
 provide input for policies and plans with regard to justice and public safety 
 propose actions to implement solutions to security problems 
 follow up on the public policies that were created from the council’s 
recommendations, with regular reports to the public 
 identify ways to finance these new policies.  
This plan is coordinated along with other national and regional initiatives such as 
the CARSI, the Estrategia de Seguridad Centroamericana (Central American Security 
Strategy, or ESCA), and the Prosperity Partnership of the Northern Triangle, among other 
efforts. The CNSCC is tasked with creating and recommending these policy changes, and 
are also responsible for the implementation of them. They will follow up with the 
progress by creating regular reports that would be accessible not just to politicians, but in 
theory they would be open to the public as well. 
The resulting plan, known as El Salvador Seguro, was ambitious and consists of 
124-points addressing five main axes. In a presentation to the media, the plan was 
announced by the administration as the next step forward in trying to move past  
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Super Mano Dura and the unofficial Gang Truce.93 The 124 points of the plan consisted 
of five sections labeled as priorities that were short-, medium-, or long-term goals. There 
are five main stakes, or priorities, that the plan focuses on. 
The first priority is violence prevention, in order to lessen the impact and better 
the lives of the citizens throughout the land. The focus is on areas with high levels of the 
root factors for insecurity such as social exclusion, restricted access, and low levels of 
socialization among its residents. By intervening in the 50 most violent municipalities’ 
drug and crime prevention institutions, and several civil sectors, the government plans on 
having more of a presence and boost youth employment as well as better their education 
and offer after-school programs. The plan calls to increase state spending on violence 
prevention, family care, victim advocacy and rehabilitation, and to strengthen 
communities by forming community policing programs. The plan is to urge the church, 
NGOs, private companies, and universities to create programs for gang members to be 
drawn to so that they can leave their gangs and reintegrate into society. The state needs to 
increase security for public transportation; a key strength for the gangs who gain by 
extorting bus drivers. Within the first year, the government planned on having a day of 
peaceful public protests against violence and insecurity by citizens in their respective 
towns. The cost of all the tasks planned in for violence prevention was estimated to be 
$1.353 billion. 
The second priority is having an effective justice system and successful criminal 
prosecutions to gain citizens’ confidence. Prior to El Salvador Seguro, the criminal 
justice system had been very ineffective, convicting about 4% of those accused of a gang-
related murder.94 The government will move toward driving out corruption by creating a 
special commission. Modernize the equipment used by criminal investigators and the 
Policía Nacional Civil (National Police Force, or PNC) so that they can do an adequate 
job of finding evidence for any cases presented. The plan calls for better communication 
between the Attorney General’s office and the PNC so that they work more effectively in 
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the questioning and investigation portion of criminal cases. The task of redistributing the 
prison population under this second priority calls for transferring 2,500 prisoners to 
appropriate locations for the level of crime that they have committed, rather than based 
solely on their gang association. That task is the one that is the most pressing for the 
gangs and one of the first pursued by the government with the most consternation. The 
cost to complete the tasks planned for improving criminal prosecution was estimated to 
be $42.44 million. 
The third priority is to lessen the influence that criminal organizations get from 
leaders that are in prisons and detention centers, and create the conditions for 
rehabilitation and reintegration in these facilities instead. The government is aware that 
prisons are overpopulated, so they plan on increasing prison infrastructure and expanding 
existing prisons to accommodate the growing prison population. In the expansion, 
investment will be made to install signal blockers to reduce cell phone strength in order 
to control prisoners and have them focus on rehabilitation and reintegration, instead of 
what is going on outside the prison walls. The infrastructure buildup will cost an 
estimated $168.8 million. 
The fourth priority is to organize and institutionalize comprehensive care for 
victims in order to reduce the impact of the damage caused by violence and crime. The 
plan is to create institutions to support those who have been struggling to get around the 
violence—physically, emotionally, or mentally—and care for them. Another task is to 
create a task force to search for missing persons throughout El Salvador, who may have 
been victims of kidnappings. The associated cost is expected to be around $36.1 million. 
The fifth point is to strengthen institutions with a coherent framework in order to 
address the causes of violence and crime so that the public will gain confidence in these 
institutions. The plan calls for reforming laws for private security services, especially 
since they outnumber federal forces and national police, and create a database for victims 
so that they can be registered expeditiously.95 The CNSCC also recommended passing a 
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Civil Service Act in order to recruit young people to serve the country in some capacity 
other than law enforcement or the military. 
The CNSCC is well aware of how important communication through the media is, 
which could be why the president presented their findings to the media in a news 
conference, touting the plan throughout the whole conference. But to be honest the plan 
does appear to be vague in its description of how the state will implement or create the 
institutions that are desired. Yet, to build support for the social programs of victim 
advocacy and youth education, the community must support their creation or their 
representatives in the Legislative Assembly will not vote for any legislation that has to do 
with El Salvador Seguro. This approach is broader than Mano Dura, but is it better? 
Figure 4 depicts the spatial analysis of homicides at a municipal level, which offers a 
glimpse in the most violent municipalities in the country. 
Figure 4.  Homicide Rate at the Municipal Level in El Salvador, 2013.96 
 
 
The plan focuses on improving the 50 most violent municipalities in El Salvador 
over a five-year span, based on the five priorities. In Chapter Five of the Woodrow 
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Wilson Center’s CARSI report, Matthew C. Ingram and Karise M. Curtis note that the 
federal level of homicides may be the highest in the region, it does not explain the whole 
situation at subnational levels.97 After reviewing Ingram and Curtis’ spatial analysis of 
crime at the department and municipality levels, there is a more in depth view of the 
areas that are most affected by criminal violence. There are 261 municipalities in El 
Salvador, and not all of them are at or above the national average in violent crime. A look 
at Figure 5 shows portions of the countryside that actually have a low amount of 
homicides. The spatial analysis shows that the higher homicide rates would cluster in 
nonrandom places, and yet, the homicide rates would affect neighboring municipalities in 
that if it increased quickly in one area, it would increase as well nearby.98 With that in 
mind, if the focus of crime prevention resources is on the 50 most violent municipalities 
and violent crime is decreased, and rehab and reintegration efforts are successful, then it 
should affect the neighboring municipalities in the same manner as it did when the 
opposite was true. 
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Figure 5.  Homicides Reported in El Salvador (2004–2015).99 
 
 
The cost associated with completing the plan has been estimated to be $2.1 billion 
to be able to properly implement every step of the 124-point plan over five years.100 Yet, 
El Salvador is one of the least tax paying countries in the Western Hemisphere, and the 
government will have to raise taxes if they are serious about funding this new strategy. 
The legislature on October 29, 2015 passed a 5% tax on companies that make over 
$500,000, which would fund $140 million over five years to go to the Institute of Legal 
Medicine (IML) and PNC.101 El Salvador does receive financial aid from the United 
States through various partnerships, to include bilateral assistance in the amount of $22.3 
million in 2014. Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact they received 
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$277 million in 2014, and the Obama Administration has been lobbying Congress to give 
$1 billion in aid to the region, $119 million of which would go to El Salvador, along with 
funds for Partnership for Growth (PFG) and CARSI.102 The Cerén administration has 
also been in negotiations with the Inter-American Development Bank for a $200 million 
loan and the CNSCC will be responsible for administering the funds in order to allow for 
more transparency than if the president’s office or another department handled it 
instead.103 The funding over the next five years would still not be enough for such a large 
amount without private investment; thus, the Cerén administration has reached out to the 
international community in search of possible foreign investors and governments, 
especially the United States, in order to make this plan a reality over the next five 
years.104 The plan is difficult to implement when businesses do not feel safe operating in 
a country whose public perception is not conducive to financial growth. The nation’s 
financial growth is stifled because of criminals extorting businesses, which has come to 
be known as la renta, or rent.105 
The security situation faces a terrible dilemma since it cannot be successful if it is 
not properly funded, yet investors will demand a safe and secure environment to carry out 
their businesses. Without a secure environment, business will not be willing to invest 
money in El Salvador. Since it will take international investment as well as government 
appropriations to fund this overture, it may be expected that countries such as the  
United States and Mexico, in their efforts to stem the drug trade trafficked through one 
country into the other with coordination and partnership with El Salvadoran gangs, will 
find more ways to provide aid in order to make this strategy a successful one. There must 
be a return on profit to draw in foreign investment. Being in areas where consumers live 
in fear of spending money or have to pay for safety to criminal networks is enough to 
scare any off investors initially, so it is up to the government to create a sense that the 
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security situation will improve with this new strategy, at least more so than it did in the 
previous dozen years under Super Mano Dura. 
C. OUTCOME OF PLAN EL SALVADOR SEGURO IN 2015 
The introduction of the plan was met with a mixture of hope and anxiousness, 
since it was the first time, since Super Mano Dura policies were enacted, that the 
government stood behind a change in the approach of dealing with crime and gang 
violence. The argument was that the new focus of El Salvador Seguro would be more 
successful at decreasing the levels of homicides and other forms of violent crime. This 
chapter’s hypothesis was that the societal approach of the plan would have had a more 
positive effect on long-term gang proliferation and would have led to a decrease in 
violent crime throughout the country. The plan should have decreased potential gang 
recruitment of minors in the 50 most violent municipalities over five years, leading to a 
domino effect in neighboring municipalities. 
With the plan present and the FMLN Party holding the presidency and also a 
majority in the unicameral Legislative Assembly, the pieces were in place politically to 
make major changes to end the violent legacy of Super Mano Dura. Without either of 
these, sweeping changes away from the Super Mano Dura policies would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to make, as was the case in the previous administration of Antonio Saca, 
the FMLN president who had to contend with an ARENA majority. Unfortunately, 2015 
would show that just because Super Mano Dura was replaced, it did not mean that the 
level of violent crime would suddenly revert to pre-2003 levels. 
The reality on the ground depends greatly on the way that Plan El Salvador 
Seguro is implemented and the reaction of the gangs for not only the change in policy, 
but also how they perceived President Cerén’s disregard for the Gang Truce.106 It appears 
that, in the short term, another hypothesis rings true in that the gangs are not be 
perceptive to the change nor appreciate being left out of the process after the dissolution 
of the Gang Truce and significantly increased the level of criminal violence throughout 
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the country. The gangs are not standing pat for this sudden change in the status quo 
without being heard from, one way or another. 
After Plan El Salvador Seguro was publicized, one of the first steps taken was the 
redistribution of the prison population, beginning with the transfer of 14 inmates that 
were considered the leaders of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs to El Salvador’s 
maximum security prison in Zacateluca, better known as Zacatraz.107 The prison moniker 
was given due to its propensity to be as infamously repressive as Alcatraz was during its 
active days, as most of the prisoners were in special cells in solitary confinement.108 This 
was the most distinct move that proved that the administration was going to try to remove 
any of the conditions that were met in the Gang Truce to try to reign in the political 
capital that the gangs had possessed in return for ordering the cessation of murders 
committed by the two largest gangs in El Salvador.109 This caused the gangs to be so 
upset that they promised to increase violence until the gang leaders were returned to the 
prisons they were in before, so that they could meet with their families and visit with 
their messengers to communicate with their gangs. 
This was the catalyst that set in motion the monthly increase in homicides, leading 
El Salvador to see some of the worst rates for criminal violence since 2009. El Salvador 
may very well have the worst rate in the world by the end of the year.110 Although the 
rate of homicides was 15 per day in January, the rate ballooned to over 20 a day in May, 
with a total of 635 gang-related homicides. This was surpassed in June, with 677 
murdered.111 August was the deadliest, with about 30 a day getting killed, as 918 were 
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recorded by the medical examiners according to reports from the PNC.112 The 
government reported that 85% of the homicides were gang-related and that it was 
necessary to not give in to pressure from the gangs and to continue with the 
implementation of the plan without negotiating with the gangs, in the same manner that 
the United States does not negotiate with terrorists. These historic levels of violence have 
caused several families to find refuge away from their homes, and may migrate to the 
United States in order to survive. 
Since the highs recorded in August, the homicide rate has dropped considerably. 
According to the reports by the PNC and IML, August had been the worst month for 
murder in the last dozen years and, although over 6,000 have been killed in 2015 alone, 
the rate is trending down in the months since, from September to November. It is not 
known why there is a sudden decrease in murders in El Salvador. Once again, five gangs 
have attempted to commit to a truce promoted by the religious Iniciativa Pastoral de la 
Vida y la Paz (Pastoral Initiative for Life and Peace, or IPAZ) after the canonization of 
the Salvadoran civil war era martyr Archbishop Romero. These gangs have presented the 
truce as an olive branch to the government in order to negotiate the release of its leaders 
from maximum security prisons to the prisons they were previously in. Whether the 
government accepts the truce in December may determine whether 2016 will also lead to 
another year of high homicide rates. Indications are that the administration is still hesitant 
to accept the gangs as a political actor, and it still remains to be proven if a truce can be 
maintained. It is difficult for any gang to control the many loosely associated smaller 
segments of itself, which are still violent and difficult to keep in line by the imprisoned 
leadership.113 
D. RESULT 
Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura did not accomplish the goal that the 
government had for them in 2003. It had time to get established, recalibrate after being in 
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effect for a short while, and still missed its mark. In Chapter II, the first and second 
hypotheses were tested and proven wrong. Therefore, alternatives had to be considered to 
reverse the trend of rising crime. Homicides reached a high of 70.9 per 100,000 by 2009, 
the year that El Salvador elected their first FMLN president in Mauricio Funes, signaling 
the exit of the ARENA Party from the executive branch after more than 20 years. 
Although the FMLN won the presidency, they failed to earn a majority in the Legislative 
Assembly and could not overcome ARENA’s objections in removing the Super Mano 
Dura policies. During the next two years, the homicide rate stayed above 60 per 100,000 
and it became evident that an alternative needed to be introduced. Different approaches 
were discussed and introduced in the form of so alternatives were sought, beginning with 
the Gang Truce. 
In 2012, a Gang Truce was brokered between Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio-18, 
the two largest gangs in El Salvador. The main actors that approached the gangs were 
members of the clergy and nongovernment organizations, with members of the 
government playing unofficial roles behind the curtain, so as to avoid any blame that may 
come if the truce were to fail to decrease crime levels. The results of the Gang Truce 
were mixed, as the homicide rate dropped dramatically from 69.9 per 100,000 in 2011, to 
41.2 per 100,000 in 2012, and 39.8 in 2013; the lowest levels since the first year of  
Mano Dura. Still, doubt existed that the Gang Truce had any tangible effect on making  
El Salvador safer due the public’s perception remaining the same about the effect that 
gang activity had on their life and by comparing statistics of other various forms of 
violent crime. The rates stayed steady despite the drop in homicides, such as with threats, 
theft, and assaults. As the election of 2014 ushered in a new president, the FMLN’s 
nominee and a former guerrilla commander, Salvador Sanchéz Cerén, the government 
was still not taking credit for the Gang Truce. 
After becoming president, the Cerén administration created a commission to 
establish a new set of policies that would ultimately replace Super Mano Dura and the 
Gang Truce officially. With the FMLN winning both the presidency and the majority of 
seats in the Legislative Assembly, it was the moment that the party of former rebels had 
been waiting for to enact real change among their society to curb gang violence. The 
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responsibility of presenting the president with a new plan moving forward fell on the 
CNSCC, which created the 124-point plan El Salvador Seguro. President Cerén 
announced the plan to the public in January 2015, less than a year after taking office.  
We have come to H3, if the velvet glove approach is implemented, then crime 
will decrease. What has occurred since El Salvador Seguro’s inception? Since then, the 
country first focused on the prison distribution aspect, separating petty criminals from the 
mass murderers, resulting in the imprisoned bosses of the gangs being sent to the 
maximum security prison known as Zacatraz, in Zacateluca. This action of cutting off 
communication between the leaders of the gangs and their street pandilleros has resulted 
in an unforeseen pushback by the gangs, leading to an explosive increase in gang 
violence and officially signaling the end of the Gang Truce. The rate of homicides gives 
the impression of a low-intensity war being waged between March and August. What 
may have been a step in the direction of building on the Gang Truce has resulted in the 
opposite effect once again; but, the results are still too early to tell what they indicate for 
the present and future. There are other signs from other portions of the plan being put into 
place that make these results inconclusive, as community organizations are beginning to 
police their neighborhoods, which will increase ownership, lessening the influence of the 
gangs. If there can be some progress on the other priorities of the plan, the revenue from 
the new taxes being imposed will generate enough income to fund portions of the plan 
that did not have money appropriated. If Salvadorans get behind the strategy, it is still 
possible that this setback of increasing rate of homicides is temporary and that the future 
of El Salvador may not be as grim as the previous dozen years have been. Still, if  
Mano Dura was not replaced until after a dozen years, El Salvador Seguro should be able 
to at least last the rest of this administration’s term, which expires five years after the 
plan was announced. 
 59
V. CONCLUSION: COMPARING MANO DURA AND  
EL SALVADOR SEGURO AND WHY IT MATTERS 
This thesis argues that El Salvador will have a better probability of decreasing 
violent crime with Plan El Salvador Seguro than it did with the Super Mano Dura 
policies. The hypotheses that inform this thesis are that with the implementation of the 
new policies violent crime will go up, it will go down, or the policies will have no effect 
on the rate of crime. With the policies being taken as the independent variable and 
citizen’s perception of security being the dependent variable, the hypothesis was made 
that with a larger focus on social programs and on aspects other than incarceration and 
repressive tactics by security forces, it would lead to a decrease in violent crime and 
violence overall by both criminals and state actors. By using the most-similar method on 
a diachronic longitudinal analysis, I took a look at how these policies were introduced 
into Salvadoran society. The results of a dozen years of Super Mano Dura policies 
conclude that by focusing only on the repressive tactics and mass incarcerations without 
being serious about rehabilitation and reintegration, and not addressing the root causes of 
violent crime in the first place, has not been successful in decreasing crime from 2003 to 
2014. What Super Mano Dura ignored, El Salvador Seguro is supposed to address. In 
theory, if the plan is followed through as written, the hypothesis is that violent crime rates 
should decrease dramatically, at the very least to pre-2003 levels, as long as it is 
supported by the citizens and properly funded by the legislature and private investments, 
as planned. This security risk has been present since the end of the civil war and it must 
be dealt with in order to improve Salvadoran society as a whole. 
A. HOW THE SECURITY SITUATION LED TO MANO DURA 
The civil war in El Salvador ended in a stalemate, and the United Nations-
administered Cojutepeque Peace Accords failed to effectively disarm the population or 
address the post conflict poverty and unemployment that plagued the majority of its 
society. Within the political transition, a security vacuum was created that allowed 
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criminal actors to take advantage of the situation and operate with little regard for the 
law. The root causes for violent crime are 
 the legacy of war  
 socioeconomic underdevelopment 
 steep income inequality 
 poverty 
 the wide disparity between rich and unemployed 
 illiteracy 
 being geographically located between the largest consumers of illicit drugs 
(i.e., the United States) and the producers and suppliers of these illicit 
drugs in South America 
 the lack of an established criminal justice system incapable of handling the 
influx of criminals deported from the United States in the 1990s were to 
take hold among the lower classes after the Peace Accords were signed in 
1992.114 The IIRIRA passed in 1996 led to an increase in deportations, 
which made Central America ripe for the proliferation of crime and 
violence created by these youth gangs that originated in Los Angeles in 
the 1990s. 
The greatest security risk that El Salvador has had to deal with since the end of 
the civil war has been the domestic threat of gang violence. For over two decades, it has 
been a menace that has had to be addressed by the Salvadoran government. What was a 
violent country during the civil war failed to turn away from the violence during the 
transition period and it caused a rise in violent crime ever since. The security situation 
required a comprehensive approach to create policies to address the levels of violent 
crime. A decade after the signing of the Peace Accords, ARENA Party member President 
Francisco Flores’ administration introduced the Mano Dura policies in 2003, after 
previous temporary anti-mara laws were passed and expired. These policies were harsh 
in nature, trying to incarcerate all those that were gang-affiliated in order for the 
conservative ARENA Party to look strong against crime. This was the beginning of the 
government’s attempt at addressing criminal violence, but it only employed repressive 
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police tactics and resulted in gangs committing more violence in response, with homicide 
levels growing every year since Super Mano Dura’s implementation. The failure to stem 
the growing violence led to the FMLN Party’s candidate winning the presidential election 
in 2009, with the promise to find a better way to address the security problem plaguing 
the country. The ARENA Party failed to keep its citizens safe by not pushing for better 
rehabilitation of the criminal population, which eventually formed the prisons into a sort 
of finishing school for petty criminals that were apprehended so that they left prison with 
a better understanding on how to further their criminal undertakings by operating under 
the gang system. 
B. MOVING ON FROM THE REPRESSIVE TACTICS OF MANO DURA 
With the election of a new president from a new party, hope arose that a different 
approach would be made to stem gang violence. FMLN Party member President 
Mauricio Funes unfortunately could not get the votes in the Legislative Assembly, or the 
political capital, to make drastic changes and throw Super Mano Dura out completely. 
His administration had to work within the limits of his office to move the country past 
those repressive policies, but the growing criminal violence pushed his government to 
revert to using the military to support the civil police. This led his administration to 
pursue a Gang Truce brokered by David Munguía Payés unofficially, with the support of 
the church and NGOs, giving concessions such as transferring these leaders to less secure 
prisons than the maximum security penitentiaries that were holding these mass 
murderers, in the hopes that the imprisoned gang leaders would make good on their 
promise to order a decrease in homicides between the gangs. The numbers support that 
this occurred, with a drastic drop in homicides from 70 per 100,000 to 41.2 a year later. 
Unfortunately, this was not enough to change the public perception of their safety since 
citizens were still being subjected to other forms of criminal violence, especially 
extortions and kidnappings. 
The Gang Truce presented an opportunity to continue decreasing criminal 
violence when engaging those who commit the violence, but this was seen as creating a 
political entity out of the gangs, and the Cerén administration after Funes’ administration 
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was adamant about not legitimizing a group that used violence as a tool for its own 
political gain. President Cerén decided to commission the CNSCC to determine a way 
ahead using the “velvet glove” approach to further the social programs that were 
instituted in the previous administration by adding it to a grand strategy in his battle with 
decreasing criminal violence. The approach of the CNSCC’s Plan El Salvador Seguro 
goes further than any previous strategy in trying to not only reign in criminal violence, 
but also address its root causes by trying to give youths alternatives away from gangs, yet 
rehabilitate and reintegrate those that may have already fallen prey to the gang life, but 
want a way out. In theory, this course of action should be considerably better than the 
previous attempts at dealing with the youth gangs, but due to Cerén’s refusal to negotiate 
with the gangs and the prison redistribution aspect of the Plan, the gangs have committed 
a significant increase in violent crimes to draw the administration back to the negotiating 
table in order to get their leaders released from Zacatraz, the nation’s maximum security 
prison. In 2015, the steep decline in security in El Salvador led to thousands of residents 
being displaced, murdered, or suffering from some form of violent crime; in essence, 
making the worst-case scenario come true in that the violence has only gotten worse. 
Despite the annual homicide rate projected to reach about 90 per 100,000 people for 
2015, the silver lining is that murders have actually been on the decline since August. If 
the government can harness this opportunity to lessen the number of homicides nationally 
and be able to implement the rest of the Plan in the municipalities that need it the most, 
over the next four years El Salvador has a chance to rebound and lift itself and its citizens 
from the low of a difficult year and come out victorious. If not, and if the decrease in 
homicides is only a mirage, then the administration may throw out the social approach at 
combating crime and reinstate Super Mano Dura to reign in the murderous gangs 
responsible for the upsurge in violence. This would just cause more instability in the 
region and contribute to the displacement and migration of Salvadorans fleeing the 
country in search of the safety and security that they cannot find at home. 
Future research on this topic could follow up on the results of violent crime 
during the rest of the El Salvador Seguro years. The comparison could still be done with 
only time being the differing factor. With more of a sample size, and as long as the 
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policies have been implemented as planned over the next five years, it is possible to get a 
better grasp on the argument and test the hypothesis again to see the results. 
Figure 6.  Homicide Rate in El Salvador (2000–2015).115  
 
 
C. WHY ANTICRIME POLICIES IN EL SALVADOR MATTER 
Why does this matter? Why should the United States care whether policies are 
repressive, support human rights, or if the rule of law is respected in a country that does 
not border the United States, nor offer a benefit such as natural resources? If El Salvador 
is not a hotbed of extremism, nor feared to be a training location for terrorists within its 
borders, why should anyone pay attention? A look at what is discussed during election 
cycles and debates offer a glimpse at what is important to Americans and how the matter 
is dealt with on foreign lands prior to it affecting Americans may be the best way to 
handle it so that the root causes may be addressed instead of just dealing with end 
results—i.e., being proactive instead of reactive. The United States has a watchful eye on 
terrorism, but it is also affected by immigration, and instability in El Salvador would only 
create an environment of chaos, the kind that enemies of the United States can exploit. 
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These concerns must be addressed immediately in order to minimize the damage they 
may make collaterally or directly to the United States. 
These policies, and how they address the problems that plague El Salvador, and 
other countries in the region, can increase or decrease immigration to the United States, 
to include 50,000 plus of unaccompanied children (UAC) at the borders. In fiscal year 
2014, 68,500 UACs were caught on the border, 77% of which were Central American 
children. They escape for several reasons, one of which is to avoid the criminal violence 
that threatens their lives every day.116 There is also having to contend with drug 
trafficking on the land bridge between producers and consumers of these illicit drugs. 
Paying attention to the history of this region and its associated security risks that affect 
the United States and Americans directly is important enough to be proactive and invest 
in this country and region. U.S. interests may save the taxpayer down the line, if not at 
the very least ensure that the money spent there is not going to waste. As a country, we 
can ill afford to not be aware of what is necessary to curb instability in the region, or else 
the problems of these countries will be on our doorstep. 
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